KDD 1999 generation faults : a review and analysis by Al Tobi, Amjad M. & Duncan, Ishbel
KDD	1999	generation	faults:	a	review	and	analysis Amjad	M.	Al	Tobia,b	and	Ishbel	Duncanb	aCentre	of	Information	Systems,	Sultan	Qaboos	University,	Al-Khoud,	Sultanate	of	Oman;	bSchool	of Computer	Science,	University	of	St.	Andrews,	Fife,	Scotland,	UK	
 
ABSTRACT	 DARPA	1998	was	one	of	the	first	Intrusion	Detection	datasets	that	was	made	publicly	available.	The	KDD	1999	dataset	was	derived	from	DARPA	1998	to	be	used	by	researchers	in	developing	machine	learning	(ML),	classification	and	clustering	algorithms	with	a	security	focus.	DARPA	1998	has	been	criticised	in	literature	due	to	raised	concerns	of	problems	in	the	dataset.	Many	research-	ers	have	accused	KDD	1999	of	having	similar	concerns	but	insuffi-	cient	published	evidence	has	been	found.	In	this	paper,	we	review	the	KDD	1999	generation	process	and	present	new	proofs	of	existing	inconsistencies	in	KDD	1999.	We	then	present	the	process	used	to	link	some	of	the	KDD	1999	(TELNET)	records	back	to	their	origins	in	DARPA	1998	and	discuss	the	interesting	results	and	findings	of	this	experiment.		
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DARPA	1998	dataset;	KDD	Cup	1999	dataset;	KDD	review;	KDD	generation	process;	KDD	generation	faults	 1.	Introduction	 The	computer	security	field,	in	general,	lacks	open	and	easy	access	to	standardised	and	up-to-date	datasets.	This	might	be	because	of	privacy	and	confidentiality	restrictions,	which	complicates	any	attempt	to	create	a	publicly	available	dataset.	As	a	result	of	the	vast	variations	of	services	and	newly	developed	tools	that	emerge	every	day,	simulation	of	different	network	traffic	is	a	difficult	task.	Therefore,	DARPA	1998	and	KDD	1999	datasets	have	been	widely	used	in	research	and	there	have	been	no	alternatives	until	recently,	when	new	datasets	such	as	the	UNB	ISCX	Intrusion	Detection	Evaluation	DataSet	2012	[1]	started	to	emerge.	The	DARPA	1998	and	KDD	1999	datasets	are	also	used	as	benchmarks	to	compare	newly	developed	systems	and	techniques	with	old	analysis	and	results.	In	this	paper,	the	DARPA	term	refers	to	the	DARPA	1998	dataset,	KDD	refers	to	the	KDD	1999	dataset	and	ML	refers	to	machine	learning.	 1.1.	DARPA	1998	dataset	 The	DARPA	dataset	[2]	was	created	in	a	joint	project	between	the	Defence	Advanced	Research	Project	Agency	(DARPA),	Lincoln	Laboratory	at	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	(MIT)	and	the	Air	Force	Research	Laboratory	(AFRL/SNHS).	The	project	(Intrusion	Detection	Evaluation	Project)	aimed	to	evaluate	different	IDS	available	at	that	time.	As	a	result	the	DARPA	dataset	was	an	attempt	to	be	the	first	standard	corpora	of	its	kind	in	the	security	field.	 The	DARPA	project	produced	two	sets	of	data.	The	first	set	is	used	for	training	purposes	and	is	composed	of	35	days	of	simulation	(7	weeks,	5	days	a	week).	The	second	set	was	aimed	at	testing	systems	under	evaluation	and	contains	10	days	of	simulation	(2	weeks,	5	days	a	week).	For	every	simulation	day,	network	traffic	traces	(TCPDUMP)	and	host	audit	data	and	traces	(BSM	[Basic	Security	Module])	are	provided.	Every	trace	is	accompanied	by	a	list	file	containing	the	attack	details	such	as	time,	machines,	ports,	attack	name,	etc.	These	attacks	are	basically	different	instances	of	four	main	classes	of	attacks,	namely:	Denial	of	Service	(DoS),	Remote	to	Local	(R2L),	User	to	Root	(U2R)	and	Probing.	Also	there	are	some	connections,	which	are	labelled	as	Anomaly.	 Details	of	the	network	setup	of	the	simulation	environment	is	provided	on	the	DARPA	project’s	website	[2].	All	datasets	and	files	are	available	for	download	from	the	project’s	archive.	In	general,	every	
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simulation	day	archive	will	contain	the	following	important	files,	which	include	all	the	required	information	and	traces	of	that	day	(see	Table	1).		
 Almost	all	network-based	security	research	focussed	on	‘tcpdump.data.gz’	and	‘tcpdump.list’	in	the	DARPA	dataset,	whereas	host-based	security	research	concentrated	on	the	other	files.	In	this	paper,	the	reported	experiment	is	focused	on	these	two	files	from	every	simulation	day	of	the	training	dataset	only,	as	they	are	the	ones	used	to	generate	the	KDD	dataset.	 The	‘tcpdump.list’	files	provide	the	label	of	every	connection	in	DARPA’s	PCAP	files	(‘tcpdump.data.gz’)	as	the	above	example	illustrates	(Table	2).	Every	connection	with	Score	zero	or	Name	‘-’	is	normal	traffic.	These	labels	were	used	in	the	generation	and	labelling	of	KDD	1999	dataset	as	well	as	used	in	the	analysis	presented	in	this	paper.		
 1.2.	KDD	1999	dataset	 KDD	[3]	is	basically	a	transformation	of	DARPA’s	network	traces	into	a	collection	of	connections’	features,	41	features	in	total.	Every	connection	between	two	hosts	will	represent	a	single	record	in	KDD,	and	every	record	will	provide	a	high	level	view	of	this	connection	based	on	the	feature	value.	The	41	features	are	divided	into	four	groups	as	shown	in	Table	3.	 Stolfo	et	al.	[4]	and	Lee	et	al	[5–7].	have	provided	some	details	of	the	KDD’s	generation	process.	They	have	used	Bro	(Network	Analysis	Framework)	[8]	to	process	the	network	traces	(‘tcpdump.data.gz’	and	‘tcpdump.list’)	from	the	two	DARPA	datasets	to	generate	the	equivalent	KDD	sets	(training	743MB	and	testing	430MB).	The	KDD	process	has	stripped	five	important	pieces	of	information	(start	time	of	connection,	source	IP,	source	port,	destination	IP	and	destination	port)	that	made	it	nearly	impossible	to	link	any	single	connection	record	to	its	source	in	the	DARPA	traces.	Without	this	information,	it	was		
that time. As a result the DARPA dataset was an attempt to be the ﬁrst standard corpora
of its kind in the security ﬁeld.
The DARPA project produced two sets of data. The ﬁrst set is used for training
purposes and is composed of 35 days of simulation (7 weeks, 5 days a week). The
second set was aimed at testing systems under evaluation and contains 10 days of
simulation (2 weeks, 5 days a week). For every simulation day, network traﬃc traces
(TCPDUMP) and host audit data and traces (BSM [Basic Security Module]) are provided.
Every trace is accompanied by a list ﬁle containing the attack details such as time,
machines, ports, attack name, etc. These attacks are basically diﬀerent instances of four
main classes of attacks, namely: Denial of Service (DoS), Remote to Local (R2L), User to
Root (U2R) and Probing. Also there are some connections, which are labelled as
Anomaly.
Details of the network setup of the simulation environment is provided on the DARPA
project’s website [2]. All datasets and ﬁles are available for download from the project’s
archive. In general, every simulation day archive will contain the following important
ﬁles, which include all the required information and traces of that day (see Table 1).
Almost all network-based security research focussed on ‘tcpdump.data.gz’ and
‘tcpdump.list’ in the DARPA dataset, whereas host-based security research concentrated
on the other ﬁles. In this paper, the reported experiment is focused on these two ﬁles
from every simulation day of the training dataset only, as they are the ones used to
generate the KDD dataset.
The ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁles provide the label of every connection in DARPA’s PCAP ﬁles
(‘tcpdump.data.gz’) as the above example illustrates (Table 2). Every connection with
Score zero or Name ‘-’ is normal traﬃc. These labels were used in the generation and
labelling of KDD 1999 dataset as well as used in the analysis presented in this paper.
1.2. KDD 1999 dataset
KDD [3] is basically a transformation of DARPA’s network traces into a collection of
connections’ features, 41 features in total. Every connection between two hosts will
represent a single record in KDD, and every record will provide a high level view of this
connection based on the feature value. The 41 features are divided into four groups as
shown in Table 3:
Stolfo et al. [4] and Lee et al [5–7]. have provided some details of the KDD’s
generation process. They have used Bro (Network Analysis Framework) [8] to process
the network traces (‘tcpdump.data.gz’ and ‘tcpdump.list’) from the two DARPA datasets
to generate the equivalent KDD sets (training 743MB and testing 430MB). The KDD
Table 1. Files provided in every simulation day in the DARPA project.
File Name Description
tcpdump.data.gz The raw tcpdump data from the sniﬀer in this simulation
tcpdump.list The list ﬁle for the tcpdump data. This ﬁle lists connections and their status
pascal.bsm.gz The actual raw BSM data from this simulation
bsm.list The list ﬁle for the BSM data.
pascal.praudit.gz ASCII version of pascal’s BSM audit data obtained by passing pascal.bsm through praudit
ps_monitor.log.gz The results of running the UNIX command ‘ps -elf’ every 60 s on the machine which was
audited
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process has stripped ﬁve important pieces of information (start time of connection, source
IP, source port, destination IP and destination port) that made it nearly impossible to link
any single connection record to its source in the DARPA traces. Without this information,
it was impossible, until now, for researchers to validate the KDD creation process. Also,
all scripts used and details of tools used along with their versions and parameter settings
were not publicly available, which has made any attempt to validate KDD a diﬃcult
quest. Given these concerns it is surprising that KDD was accepted as a defacto standard
for researchers to test their algorithms and detection systems. Since then no published
paper has ever analysed or validated this creation process, although, Perona et al. [9],
have replicated the generation process of the KDD1999. However, their replication was
not intended to address the limitations of the KDD1999, instead it aimed to extend the
connections proﬁling by including their contents (payloads). Their study showed that
analysis of the connections’ content can be used to detect attacks in network traﬃc.
However, this ﬁnding will be restricted when such traﬃc is encrypted, as is the case with
Table 2. Example of DARPA 1998 ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁle content.
Table 3. KDD 1999 features.
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	impossible,	until	now,	for	researchers	to	validate	the	KDD	creation	process.	Also,	all	scripts	used	and	details	of	tools	used	along	with	their	versions	and	parameter	settings	were	not	publicly	available,	which	has	made	any	attempt	to	validate	KDD	a	difficult	quest.	Given	these	concerns	it	is	surprising	that	KDD	was	accepted	as	a	defacto	standard	for	researchers	to	test	their	algorithms	and	detection	systems.	Since	then	no	published	paper	has	ever	analysed	or	validated	this	creation	process,	although,	Perona	et	al.	[9],	have	replicated	the	generation	process	of	the	KDD1999.	However,	their	replication	was	not	intended	to	address	the	limitations	of	the	KDD1999,	instead	it	aimed	to	extend	the	connections	profiling	by	including	their	contents	(payloads).	Their	study	showed	that	analysis	of	the	connections’	content	can	be	used	to	detect	attacks	in	network	traffic.	However,	this	finding	will	be	restricted	when	such	traffic	is	encrypted,	as	is	the	case	with	the	modern	traffic.	This	study	has	resulted	in	the	generation	of	a	new	dataset	called	gureKddcup	database	[9]	that	is	similar	to	the	KDD1999,	however,	much	cleaner	with	all	payloads	extracted.	 It	is	worth	noting	our	analysis	of	KDD	has	revealed	that	the	definition	of	a	connection	for	ICMP	is	different	from	UDP	and	TCP.	We	noted	that	every	ICMP	packet	is	treated	as	a	single	connection	(state-less),	whereas	every	connection	in	UDP	and	TCP	consists	of	a	sequence	of	exchanged	packets	between	two	machines	(state-full).	This	was	evident	by	the	fact	that	the	destination	bytes	field	(Feature	6:	dst_bytes)	in	all	ICMP	connections	is	always	set	to	zero.	That	would	mean	there	was	no	response	from	the	other	end	of	communicating	parties.	This	was	not	the	case	for	UDP	and	TCP	connections.	 In	this	paper,	we	present	important	discoveries	that	indicate	serious	flaws	in	KDD	and	we	question	its	generation	process	through	comparative	analysis	and	identification	of	mismatches.	We	reveal	many	inconsistencies	that	affect	many	of	KDD’s	features,	which	question	its	reliability	and	suitability.	 2.	Existing	criticism	 In	this	section,	we	provide	the	main	criticisms	discussed	in	IDS	literature	about	both	datasets;	DARPA	and	KDD.	 2.1.	DARPA	 Almost	all	criticism	in	the	literature	is	directed	against	DARPA	and	mainly	concern	its	representation	of	reality.	All	DARPA	criticism	is	inherited	by	KDD	as	it	is	a	transformation	of	the	original	dataset.	However,	there	was	no	secondary	investigation	into	how	it	was	generated	and	the	possible	faults	it	might	have,	independent	from	DARPA	concerns.	Brugger	[10],	has	called	for	stopping	the	use	of	KDD	in	research	and	provided	some	criticism	against	DARPA	as	the	source	of	KDD,	but	not	the	KDD	dataset	itself.	Brugger	[10],	has	criticised	the	DARPA	dataset	for	including	a	very	limited	number	of	attacks	which	can	be	detected	with	a	fixed	signature.	 Many	have	investigated	the	credibility	of	the	DARPA	dataset	and	many	others	have	questioned	its	validity.	For	example,	McHugh’s	[11,12]	criticism	was	focused	on	the	generation	methods	of	DARPA.	He	has	mainly	questioned	the	process	of	evaluating	a	real	world	system’s	performance	by	using	experimental	data.	He	has	questioned	the	level	to	which	the	use	of	synthetic	traffic	is	suitable	for	the	
process has stripped ﬁve important pieces of information (start time of connection, source
IP, source port, destination IP and destination port) that made it nearly impossible to link
any single connection record to its source in the DARPA traces. Without this information,
it was impossible, until now, for researchers to validate the KDD creation process. Also,
all scripts used and details of tools used along with their versions and parameter settings
were not publicly available, which has made any attempt to validate KDD a diﬃcult
quest. Given these concerns it is surprising that KDD was accepted as a defacto standard
for researchers to test their algorithms and detection systems. Since then no published
paper has ever analysed or validated this creation process, although, Perona et al. [9],
have replicated the generation process of the KDD1999. However, their replication was
not intended to address the limitations of the KDD1999, instead it aimed to extend the
connections proﬁling by including their contents (payloads). Their study showed that
analysis of the connections’ content can be used to detect attacks in network traﬃc.
However, this ﬁnding will be restricted when such traﬃc is encrypted, as is the case with
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evaluation	task.	He	also	raised	some	concerns	about	the	possible	effects	potentially	caused	by	the	architecture	of	the	simulation	environment	on	the	overall	evaluation.	 McHugh	[11,12]	also	questioned	the	use	of	ROC	(Receiver	Operating	Characteristic)	curve	as	a	method	for	presenting	the	evaluation	results.	He	has	raised	doubts	about	some	unexpected	problems	that	might	take	place	by	using	this	form	of	analysis	in	the	IDS	evaluation	domain.	The	main	problems	that	he	has	highlighted	are,	‘determining	appropriate	units	of	analysis,	bias	towards	possibly	unrealistic	detection	approaches,	and	questionable	presentations	of	false	alarm	data’.	 Mahoney	and	Chan	[13,14]	criticised	DARPA	on	the	data	level.	They	have	noted	that	most	of	the	attacks	in	DARPA	can	be	detected	using	the	TTL	(Time-to-live)	field	in	packets	headers.	They	have	noted	that	the	DARPA	training	set	has	eight	distinct	TTL	values,	which	is	an	unrealistic	setup.	This	might	be	caused	by	the	scripts	and	software	used	to	generate	traffic	in	the	testing	environment.	 2.2.	KDD	 Although	many	researchers	believe	that	KDD	has	inherited	DARPA’s	problems,	no	evidence	is	provided	to	backup	this	claim.	There	were	a	number	of	attempts	to	analyse	KDD	but	no	actual	validation	or	firm	evaluation,	especially	on	its	generation	process,	was	ever	conducted.	 Tavallaee	et	al.	[15],	have	attempted	to	analyse	KDD	and	they	have	argued	that	the	large	number	of	redundant	records	in	KDD	is	one	of	the	main	deficiencies	of	this	dataset.	Therefore,	they	suggested	removing	duplicate	records	and	as	a	result	they	produced	a	shorter	version	called	NSL-KDD.	They	assumed	that	records	with	exact	feature	values	were	duplicates.	However,	removing	these	records	from	KDD	–	based	on	that	assumption	–	was	not	reasonable,	as	it	is	not	logical	to	identify	redundant	records	without	having	access	to	their	timestamp,	source	and	destination	addresses	and	ports.	That	is	because	DARPA	was	composed	of	synthetic	traffic,	which	was	mostly	produced	using	scripts	or	software	by	varying	parameters.	This	could	have	generated	identical	traffic	but	between	different	hosts	at	different	times,	which,	when	this	informa-	tion	is	stripped,	will	produce	the	illusion	of	having	identical	traffic.	Also,	as	noted	in	the	Introduction,	KDD	treated	every	ICMP	packet	as	a	single	connection.	These	cases	produced	traffic	that	looked	identical	in	many	cases,	resulting	in	identical	records	in	the	KDD	dataset.	Based	on	the	discussion	in	the	next	section	(3.	DARPA	vs.	KDD),	this	claim	of	redundancy	was	confirmed	by	comparing	DARPA	and	KDD,	but	identifying	the	duplicate	records	is	not	easy	task.	Identifying	these	duplications	the	way	Tavallaee	et	al.	[15],	have	done	has	similarly	raised	concerns.	 The	production	of	NSL-KDD	has	introduced	some	confusion	between	researchers,	as	many	believe	KDD	and	NSL-KDD	are	the	same.	For	example,	Wutyi	and	Thwin	[16],	used	KDD	in	their	experiment,	according	to	their	references,	but	in	their	paper	they	referred	to	the	dataset	as	NSL-KDD.	Strangely	enough,	some	researchers	get	confused	between	DARPA	and	KDD.	For	example,	Creech	and	Hu	[17],	listed	criticism	of	KDD	and	its	weak	performance	under	classification	and	ML	algorithms,	but	careful	examination	of	their	references	demonstrates	that	they	were	referring	to	the	DARPA	dataset.	 In	another	attempt	to	analyse	KDD,	Portnoy	et	al.	[18],	have	partitioned	KDD’s	training	data	into	10	subsets,	where	each	subset	is	about	10%	of	the	original	dataset.	They	have	observed	that	the	attacks	in	the	KDD	dataset	were	not	evenly	distributed,	which	has	made	their	attempt	to	cross-validate	very	difficult.	It	seems	that	they	have	based	their	work	on	an	assumption	which	neglects	a	crucial	fact	about	KDD.	The	dataset	aggregates	35	days	of	traffic	into	a	single	collection	where	the	record	order	and	distribution	were	not	taken	into	consideration.	KDD’s	documentation	provides	no	hint	about	the	order	of	these	records.	Therefore,	it	is	possible	to	find	a	connection	from	the	35th	simulation	day	at	the	beginning	of	the	KDD	dataset,	as	our	experiment	has	revealed.	In	addition,	a	quick	analysis	on	DARPA	revealed	that	traffic	and	attack	distributions	between	simulation	days	are	not	equally	distributed;	there	are	days	that	have	far	higher	attack	traffic	than	others.	This	was	done	deliberately	to	reflect	real	network	traffic	as	much	as	possible.	Therefore,	splitting	KDD	into	ten	distinct	subsets	was	neither	justified	nor	reasonable.	 Leung	and	Leckie	[19]	pointed	out	that	smurf	and	neptune	attacks	affect	evaluations	as	they	form	over	71%	of	the	KDD	dataset.	Therefore,	they	have	suggested	the	use	of	other	means	to	detect	these	types	of	attacks	and	avoid	the	use	of	anomaly	detection	systems.	This	claim	neglects	the	fact	that	the	KDD	dataset	
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is	meant	to	provide	a	high	level	view	of	every	connection	in	the	network	from	which	ML	algorithms	or	tools	were	to	test	their	capabilities	in	distinguishing	anomalous	traffic	from	benign	ones.	The	high	number	of	counts	of	these	two	attacks	could	be	a	result	of	the	way	KDD	is	treating	ICMP	traffic	-as	explained	in	the	Introduction-	or	due	to	the	duplication	presented	in	the	next	section	(3.	DARPA	vs.	KDD).	 Bouzida	et	al.	[20,21]	ran	statistical	analysis	on	KDD	and	concluded	that	KDD’s	feature	set	has	serious	limitations,	rendering	ML	algorithms	inappropriate	for	the	task.	They	have	reasoned	the	failure	to	detect	the	Remote	to	Local	(R2L)	attacks	are	due	to	problems	in	the	transformation	of	DARPA	into	KDD.	They	also	considered	the	training	and	test	datasets	of	KDD	to	be	incoherent.	 Sabhnani	et	al.	[22,23]	have	suggested	that	training	and	testing	datasets	of	KDD	are	addressing	non	similar	hypothesis	for	Remote	to	Local	(R2L)	and	Local	to	Remote	(L2R)	attacks,	which	has	resulted	in	a	low	detection	rate	of	these	types	of	attacks.	They	have	also	pointed	out	that	the	KDD	dataset	fails	to	provide	an	acceptable	framework	for	training	as	the	training	dataset	contains	diminished	and	distorted	attack	signatures.	 Engen	et	al.	[24]	have	addressed	the	problem	of	misclassification	of	R2L	intrusions,	where	they	have	concluded	that	there	are	lots	of	normal	connections	identical	to	R2L	attacks.	This	was	evident	by	Bouzida’s	[20,21]	findings,	for	example	they	have	shown	that	there	are	8054	normal	connections	identical	to	snmpgetattack	intrusions.	As	a	result,	Engen	et	al.	[24]	have	listed	four	possible	causes	to	this;	‘flaws	in	the	data	collection	for	the	DARPA	evaluation,	limitations	in	Tcpdump,	mislabelling	or	limitations	in	the	transformation	of	DARPA	Tcpdump	to	the	KDD	Cup	’99	data’.	The	latter	is	confirmed	by	the	work	presented	in	this	paper.	 All	presented	criticism	have	analysed	one	dataset	independently	from	the	other	and	no	solid	evidence	for	their	conclusions	and	claims	have	ever	been	produced.	This	work	provides	solid	evidence	to	the	claims	raised	by	Mahoney	and	Chan	[13,14],	Tavallaee	et	al.	[15],	Engen	et	al.	[24]	and	Brugger’s	[10].	It	is	unique	in	terms	of	linking	connections	between	DARPA	and	KDD	and	identifying	many	serious	flaws	in	the	generation	process	itself.	Table	4	provides	a	map	of	the	analysis	focus	of	every	publication	listed	above.		
 The	main	contribution	of	this	work	is	the	analysis	and	the	identification	of	the	problems	in	the	generation	process	of	the	KDD	dataset.	The	original	process	was	neither	evaluated	nor	analysed	in	any	way	to	test	its	validity	in	comparison	to	the	original	data.	If	this	process	was	perfected	and	made	available	for	the	research	community,	we	could	have	had	various	KDD-like	datasets.	These	could	have	evolved	through	time,	introducing	new	attacks	in	new	ways	or	domains,	with	new	feature	sets	or	specific	features	for	certain	attack	classes.		
 
TCP traﬃc than what actually existed in DARPA. It also migrated less of ICMP and UDP
traﬃc with no standard proportion sizes. This table was constructed by summing the
src_bytes and dst_bytes values in KDD for every protocol (ICMP, TCP and UDP). In
DARPA, every PCAP ﬁle has been processed to compute the payload size of every packet
and sum their total by the traﬃc type – ICMP, TCP and UDP.
Our initial attempt to understand the logic used to compute the Content Features in
KDD has led to the analysis discussed in this paper. We linked some KDD connections to
DARPA in order to extract the content of these connections and analysed them to
reverse engineer the rules used to compute these features. This analysis has led to a
deeper exploration to determine the solid linking mechanisms between the parent
(DARPA) and the child (KDD) datasets.
I our ﬁrst experiment t link the two datasets together, we mapped the attack types
between DARPA and KDD. We counted the number of every attack type in DARPA as
provided in the ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁles of all the 35 simulation days of the training set and
matched them with their equivalents in the KDD dataset. These ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁles
provide a connection view of the DARPA dataset – as illustrated in Table 2 – and they
form the original ground truth used to construct the KDD.
The following table (Table 6) shows the mapping of ALL attacks in KDD to their
sources in DARPA along with the percentage of those attack connections in KDD with
respect to DARPA. This table has revealed an important discovery. It clearly shows that
KDD has more smurf and imap attacks than occur in DARPA. This would mean either
normal connections were incorrectly classiﬁed as attacks in KDD, as pointed out by
Engen et al. [24], or duplication has taken place in the generation process, as argued by
Tavallaee et al. [15]. This has resulted in KDD having more than double the total attacks
in DARPA.
Table 4. Publication’s analysis focus.
DARPA KDD
● Brugger [10],
● McHugh [11,12],
● Mahoney and Chan [13,14 ]
● Tavallaee et al. [15],
● Portnoy et al. [18],
● Leung and Leckie [19],
● Bouzida et al. [20],
● Bouzida [21]
● Sabhnani et al. [22,23]
Our focus and contributions in this paper. We:
● Compare DARAP and KDD together
● Identify the mismatches between the number of attack connections between DARPA and KDD as well as
the diﬀerences in the total exchanged payload (two way analysis),
● Determine a linking key to match records between DARPA and KDD,
● Link Telnet connections from KDD back to their sources in DARPA and extract their content,
● Analyse the content-based features’ construction process, based on the matched records,
● Identify – with evidence – problems in feature generation and computation.
Table 5. DARPA and KDD total exchanged bytes of protocols’ payloads.
Protocol
DARPA
(Bytes)
KDD
(Bytes)
Percentage
(KDD÷ DARPA)
ICMP 7,892,338,710 2,629,222,857 33.31%
TCP 6,978,605,268 11,678,578,061 167.35%
UDP 70,507,806 36,000,213 51.06%
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3.	DARPA	vs.	KDD	 3.1.	General	comparison	between	DARPA	and	KDD	 In	our	experiment	we	have	started	our	analysis	by	comparing	the	total	size	of	exchanged	packets	of	every	protocol	between	DARPA	and	KDD.	This	analysis	–	as	the	following	Table	5	shows	–	has	revealed	a	major	flaw	in	KDD	dataset	as	it	contains	more	TCP	traffic	than	what	actually	existed	in	DARPA.	It	also	migrated	less	of	ICMP	and	UDP	traffic	with	no	standard	proportion	sizes.	This	table	was	constructed	by	summing	the	src_bytes	and	dst_bytes	values	in	KDD	for	every	protocol	(ICMP,	TCP	and	UDP).	In	DARPA,	every	PCAP	file	has	been	processed	to	compute	the	payload	size	of	every	packet	and	sum	their	total	by	the	traffic	type	–	ICMP,	TCP	and	UDP.		
	
	Our	initial	attempt	to	understand	the	logic	used	to	compute	the	Content	Features	in	KDD	has	led	to	the	analysis	discussed	in	this	paper.	We	linked	some	KDD	connections	to	DARPA	in	order	to	extract	the	
TCP traﬃc than what actually existed in DARPA. It also migrated less of ICMP and UDP
traﬃc with no standard proportion sizes. This table was constructed by summing the
src_bytes and dst_bytes values in KDD for every protocol (ICMP, TCP and UDP). In
DARPA, every PCAP ﬁle has been processed to compute the payload size of every packet
and sum their total by the traﬃc type – ICMP, TCP and UDP.
Our initial attempt to understand the logic used to compute the Content Features in
KDD has led to the analysis discussed in this paper. We linked some KDD connections to
DARPA in order to extract the content of these connections and analysed them to
reverse engineer the rules used to compute these features. This analysis has led to a
deeper exploration to determine the solid linking mechanisms between the parent
(DARPA) and the child (KDD) datasets.
In our ﬁrst experiment to link the two datasets together, we mapped the attack types
between DARPA and KDD. We counted the number of every attack type in DARPA as
provided in the ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁles of all the 35 simulation days of the training set and
matched them with their equivalents in the KDD dataset. These ‘tcpdump.list’ ﬁles
provide a connection view of the DARPA dataset – as illustrated in Table 2 – and they
form the original ground truth used to construct the KDD.
The following table (Table 6) shows the mapping of ALL attacks in KDD to their
sources in DARPA along with the percentage of those attack connections in KDD with
respect to DARPA. This table has revealed an important discovery. It clearly shows that
KDD has more smurf and imap attacks than occur in DARPA. This would mean either
normal connections were incorrectly classiﬁed as attacks in KDD, as pointed out by
Engen et al. [24], or duplication has taken place in the generation process, as argued by
Tavallaee et al. [15]. This has resulted in KDD having more than double the total attacks
in DARPA.
Table 4. Publication’s analysis focus.
DARPA KDD
● Brugger [10],
● McHugh [11,12],
● Mahoney and Chan [13,14 ]
● Tavallaee et al. [15],
● Portnoy et al. [18],
● Leung and Leckie [19],
● Bouzida et al. [20],
● Bouzida [21]
● Sabhnani et al. [22,23]
Our focus and contributions in this paper. We:
● Compare DARAP and KDD together
● Identify the mismatches between the number of attack connections between DARPA and KDD as well as
the diﬀerences in the total exchanged payload (two way analysis),
● Determine a linking key to match records between DARPA and KDD,
● Link Telnet connections from KDD back to their sources in DARPA and extract their content,
● Analyse the content-based features’ construction process, based on the matched records,
● Identify – with evidence – problems in feature generation and computation.
Table 5. DARPA and KDD total exchanged bytes of protocols’ payloads.
Protocol
DARPA
(Bytes)
KDD
(Bytes)
Percentage
(KDD÷ DARPA)
ICMP 7,892,338,710 2,629,222,857 33.31%
TCP 6,978,605,268 11,678,578,061 167.35%
UDP 70,507,806 36,000,213 51.06%
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Moreover, it is also not clear if the selection of traﬃc was random or not, as the
percentages, also shown in Table 6, demonstrate a great deal of variations between
attack types. For instance, we found that only 2.51% of pod attack were added to KDD,
whereas 100% of other attacks (ftp-write, spy, etc. . .) were migrated. In addition, it
was not stated anywhere in the documentation of KDD how anomaly connections
were treated and whether they were added to KDD as normal traﬃc, or ignored. An
anomaly connection is one where there is deliberate uncommon behaviour by users,
such as logging in at night time, to test the system.
As our attempt was to reverse engineer the Content Features construction process, we
analysed KDD to discover what type of traﬃc aﬀects these features. Therefore, we extracted
all connection records that have at least one of their Content Features (10–22) set to a
value greater than zero. After that, we analysed the services within those connections.
Table 7 shows the services and their respective Content Features. Values of those features
represent the maximum value found with respect to the service under consideration. For
Table 6. DARPA and KDD attacks mapping.
Attack
Class
DARPA KDD
Counts Attack Counts Attack
Percentage
KDD/DARPA
DOS 2,281 back 2,203 back 96.58%
35 land 21 land 60.00%
1,526,643 neptune 1,072,017 neptune 70.22%
10,498 pod 264 pod 2.51%
250,133 smurf 2,807,886 smurf 1,122.56%
2,173 teardrop 979 teardrop 45.05%
4 syslog 0.00%
R2L 881 dict 53 guess_passwd 5.69%
1 dict_simple
50 guest
8 ftp-write 8 ftp_write 100.00%
8 imap 12 imap 150.00%
9 multihop 7 multihop 77.78%
5 phf 4 phf 80.00%
2 spy 2 spy 100.00%
1,766 warezclient 1,020 warezclient 57.72%
1 warzclient
1 warez 20 warezmaster 100.00%
19 warezmaster
U2R 11 eject 30 buﬀer_overﬂow 96.77%
1 eject-fail
10 ﬀb
1 ﬀb_clear
6 format
1 format_clear
1 format-fail
1 load_clear 9 loadmodule 75.00%
11 loadmodule
1 perl_clear 3 perl 60.00%
4 perlmagic
254 rootkit 10 rootkit 3.94%
PROBING 16,336 ipsweep 12,481 ipsweep 76.40%
2,357 nmap 2,316 nmap 98.26%
10,617 portsweep 10,413 portsweep 98.08%
32,632 satan 15,892 satan 48.70%
ANOMALY 9 anomaly 0.00%
TOTAL 1,856,771 3,925,650 211.42%
8 A. M. AL TOBI AND I. DUNCAN
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content	of	these	connections	and	analysed	them	to	reverse	engineer	the	rules	used	to	compute	these	features.	This	analysis	has	led	to	a	deeper	exploration	to	determine	the	solid	linking	mechanisms	between	the	parent	(DARPA)	and	the	child	(KDD)	datasets.		In	our	first	experiment	to	link	the	two	datasets	together,	we	mapped	the	attack	types	between	DARPA	and	KDD.	We	counted	the	number	of	every	attack	type	in	DARPA	as	provided	in	the	‘tcpdump.list’	files	of	all	the	35	simulation	days	of	the	training	set	and	matched	them	with	their	equivalents	in	the	KDD	dataset.	These	‘tcpdump.list’	files	provide	a	connection	view	of	the	DARPA	dataset	–	as	illustrated	in	Table	5	–	and	they	form	the	original	ground	truth	used	to	construct	the	KDD.		The	following	table	(Table	6)	shows	the	mapping	of	ALL	attacks	in	KDD	to	their	sources	in	DARPA	along	with	the	percentage	of	those	attack	connections	in	KDD	with	respect	to	DARPA.	This	table	has	revealed	an	important	discovery.	It	clearly	shows	that	KDD	has	more	smurf	and	imap	attacks	than	occur	in	DARPA.	This	would	mean	either	normal	connections	were	incorrectly	classified	as	attacks	in	KDD,	as	pointed	out	by	Engen	et	al.	[24],	or	duplication	has	taken	place	in	the	generation	process,	as	argued	by	Tavallaee	et	al.	[15].	This	has	resulted	in	KDD	having	more	than	double	the	total	attacks	in	DARPA.	 Moreover,	it	is	also	not	clear	if	the	selection	of	traffic	was	random	or	not,	as	the	percentages,	also	shown	in	Table	6,	demonstrate	a	great	deal	of	variations	between	attack	types.	For	instance,	we	found	that	only	2.51%	of	pod	attack	were	added	to	KDD,	whereas	100%	of	other	attacks	(ftp-write,	spy,	etc.	.	.)	were	migrated.	In	addition,	it	was	not	stated	anywhere	in	the	documentation	of	KDD	how	anomaly	connections	were	treated	and	whether	they	were	added	to	KDD	as	normal	traffic,	or	ignored.	An	anomaly	connection	is	one	where	there	is	deliberate	uncommon	behaviour	by	users,	such	as	logging	in	at	night	time,	to	test	the	system.		
 As	our	attempt	was	to	reverse	engineer	the	Content	Features	construction	process,	we	analysed	KDD	to	discover	what	type	of	traffic	affects	these	features.	Therefore,	we	extracted	all	connection	records	that	have	at	least	one	of	their	Content	Features	(10–22)	set	to	a	value	greater	than	zero.	After	that,	we	analysed	the	services	within	those	connections.	Table	7	shows	the	services	and	their	respective	Content	Features.	Values	of	those	features	represent	the	maximum	value	found	with	respect	to	the	service	under	consideration.	For	example,	the	maximum	value	of	feature	16	(num_root)	in	the	Telnet	service	is	7468.	
example, the maximum value of feature 16 (num_root) in the Telnet service is 7468.
The minimum values of these features is always zero. It is also clear that feature 20
(num_outbound_cmds) is always zero. This raises a serious question about its contribu-
tion to the dataset.
The Telnet service contributes to 12 out of 13 features as clearly shown in Table 7.
Therefore, the experiments described in this paper were focused on Telnet
connections.
Table 7 presents another important observation, which is the generalization of
features to all services. This generalisation could be considered as one of the main
drawbacks of KDD. The presence of these features in connections, such as ICMP
connections, will aﬀect the learning abilities of ML algorithms and tools. This could
provide an explanation of the failure in detecting attacks based on these features, such
as R2L and U2R attacks.
4. Matching connections between DARPA and KDD
The second presented experiment has a number of phases, where every phase was
aimed at understanding one part of the KDD’s construction process. Initially basic
statistical analysis of the data (KDD and DARPA) was generated and compared. Then
subsets of both datasets were selected for further analysis and matching up.
Table 7. Content features for services.
Service Count
Content Feature Number
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
auth 1814 1 1 1
daytime 1 1
discard 1 1
domain 37 1 1
echo 1 1
ﬁnger 27 3
ftp 4125 30 4 1 21 1 1
ftp_data 30,464 7 1 9 1 9 2 1 1
gopher 6 1 1
http 567,498 21 1 21 1 1 1 1
imap4 7 2 1 16 16 1
IRC 363 6 1
login 3 1 1 1 1
netbios_ssn 1 1
nntp 5 1
pop_2 1 1
pop_3 923 1 1 1 1 3
printer 1 1
private 8 1
shell 2 1 4
smtp 95,157 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 2
ssh 21 1 1
sunrpc 2 1
telnet 2218 77 5 1 7479 1 2 7468 43 2 9 1 1
time 13 1 1
uucp 3 1
X11 84 1 1 1
other 434 5 1 9 2 1 1
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The	minimum	values	of	these	features	is	always	zero.	It	is	also	clear	that	feature	2	(num_outbound_cmds)	is	always	zero.	This	raises	a	serious	question	about	its	contribution	to	the	dataset. The	Telnet	service	contributes	to	12	out	of	13	features	as	clearly	shown	in	Table	7.	Therefore,	the	experiments	described	in	this	paper	were	focused	on	Telnet	connections.	 Table	7	presents	another	important	observation,	which	is	the	generalization	of	features	to	all	services.	This	generalisation	could	be	considered	as	one	of	the	main	drawbacks	of	KDD.	The	presence	of	these	features	in	connections,	such	as	ICMP	connections,	will	affect	the	learning	abilities	of	ML	algorithms	and	tools.	This	could	provide	an	explanation	of	the	failure	in	detecting	attacks	based	on	these	features,	such	as	R2L	and	U2R	attacks.			4.	Matching	connections	between	DARPA	and	KDD	 The	second	presented	experiment	has	a	number	of	phases,	where	every	phase	was	aimed	at	understanding	one	part	of	the	KDD’s	construction	process.	Initially	basic	statistical	analysis	of	the	data	(KDD	and	DARPA)	was	generated	and	compared.	Then	subsets	of	both	datasets	were	selected	for	further	analysis	and	matching	up. 4.1.	Phase	1	–	matching	telnet	attacks	 We	conducted	another	general	attack	type	mapping	between	DARPA	and	KDD,	but	this	time	focused	on	Telnet	connections	only.	This	was	to	determine	the	possibility	and	feasibility	of	conducting	manual	matching	of	these	attack	connections	between	the	two	datasets.	The	following	table	–	Table	8	–	shows	that	a	manageable	number	of	cases	exists	for	the	manual	matching	attempt.		
	The	manual	analysis	of	the	actual	content	of	the	Telnet	connections	was	not	avoid-	able.	This	was	because	of	the	nature	of	dataset	and	its	poor	documentation	and	lack	of	its	original	generation	tools.	This	was	a	result	of	the	fact	that,	these	content-based	features	in	KDD,	were	generated	based	on	the	actual	payloads	
4.1. Phase 1 – matching telnet attacks
We conducted another general attack type mapping between DARPA and KDD, but this
time focused on T lnet connections only. This was to determine the possibility and
feasibility of conducting manual matching of these attack connections between the two
datasets. The following table – Table 8 – shows that a manageable number of cases
exists for the manual matching attempt.
The manual analysis of the actual content of the Telnet connections was not avoid-
able. This was because of the nature of dataset and its poor documentation and lack of
its original generation tools. This was a result of the fact that, these content-based
features in KDD, were generated based on the actual payloads of these connections.
Hence, as KDD’s generation scripts are not available, we have had to focus on a subset of
the dataset to evaluate this generation process. The approach presented in this paper
can be easily extended to other services as well.
In order to be able to match records from KDD to connections in DARPA, we had to
identify matching keys using the existing KDD features. Therefore, manual analysis and
matching has introduced the use of duration, source bytes and destination bytes
(features 1, 5 and 6) as promising keys to match Telnet connections. In the coming
sections, the term ‘Successfully mapped’ means that we mapped a KDD record to its
original connection in DARPA using all three features (duration, src_bytes, dst_bytes).
The term ‘partially mapped’ means we have used two features (src_bytes, dst_bytes) in
the mapping process.
Table 8. Mapped attacks of telnet connections in DARPA and KDD.
Attack
Class
DARPA – TELNET KDD – TELNET
Counts Attack Counts Attack
Percentage
KDD/DARPA
DOS 1 land 1 land 100.00%
2,373 neptune 1,923 neptune 81.04%
1,773 teardrop 0.00%
R2L 881 dict 53 guess_passwd 5.69%
1 dict_simple
50 guest
4 multihop 2 multihop 50.00%
2 spy 2 spy 100.00%
U2R 11 eject 21 buﬀer_overﬂow 100.00%
1 eject-fail
5 ﬀb
1 ﬀb_clear
1 format
1 format_clear
1 format-fail
1 load_clear 5 loadmodule 62.50%
7 loadmodule
1 perl_clear 3 perl 60.00%
4 perlmagic
6 rootkit 8 rootkit 83.33%
PROBING 14 ipsweep 14 ipsweep 100.00%
3 nmap 1 nmap 33.33%
18 portsweep 13 portsweep 72.22%
13 satan 7 satan 53.85%
ANOMALY 9 anomaly 0.00%
TOTAL 5,182 2,050 39.56%
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of	these	connections.	Hence,	as	KDD’s	generation	scripts	are	not	available,	we	have	had	to	focus	on	a	subset	of	the	dataset	to	evaluate	this	generation	process.	The	approach	presented	in	this	paper	can	be	easily	extended	to	other	services	as	well.		In	order	to	be	able	to	match	records	from	KDD	to	connections	in	DARPA,	we	had	to	identify	matching	keys	using	the	existing	KDD	features.	Therefore,	manual	analysis	and	matching	has	introduced	the	use	of	duration,	source	bytes	and	destination	bytes	(features	1,	5	and	6)	as	promising	keys	to	match	Telnet	connections.	In	the	coming	sections,	the	term	‘Successfully	mapped’	means	that	we	mapped	a	KDD	record	to	its	original	connection	in	DARPA	using	all	three	features	(duration,	src_bytes,	dst_bytes).	The	term	‘partially	mapped’	means	we	have	used	two	features	(src_bytes,	dst_bytes)	in	the	mapping	process.		The	first	row	of	Table	9	shows	that	there	are	over	50%	of	Telnet	records	in	KDD	with	a	unique	key.	That	means	every	record	within	that	50%	has	a	distinct	key	that	identifies	this	record	alone.	This	gives	us	a	good	probability	for	one-to-one	matching	of	Telnet	connections	between	KDD	and	DARPA.	 The	last	row	of	Table	9	shows	that	there	are	45%	of	Telnet	connections	with	the	same	key.	Most	of	these	are	the	neptune	and	portsweep	attack	connections,	where	they	share	the	same	matching	key	value.	Appendix	A	presents	an	example	of	some	successful	mapping	of	the	Telnet	attack	connections.	 
 We	have	used	the	term	collision	to	determine	the	number	of	records	each	key	will	map	to.	For	example,	a	key	with	a	collision	degree	of	3,	would	mean	there	are	three	records	which	have	the	same	key	(duration,	src_bytes,	dst_bytes).	 Throughout	our	analysis,	two	out	of	the	53	guess_passwd	attacks	in	KDD	did	not	map	to	any	of	DARPA’s	attacks.	The	mapping	key	(0,126,179)	aggregated	40/53	guess_passwd	KDD	connections	which	were	successfully	mapped	to	38	connections	in	DARPA	with	the	same	key.	The	remaining	two	connections	did	not	even	partially	map	to	any	connection.	 Table	10	presents	the	number	of	connections	for	every	TCP	service	in	KDD.	It	also	shows	the	percentage	of	the	uniquely	identifiable	connections	among	all	connections	of	a	certain	service.	As	it	can	be	seen,	only	X11,	IRC,	smtp	and	telnet	services	have	more	than	50%	of	their	connections	are	uniquely	identifiable	using	the	Key[dura-	tion,	src_bytes,	dst_bytes].	Services	like	http_2784	and	pm_dump	have	very	small	number	of	connections	to	be	attractive	for	this	investigation.	 As	a	result,	the	selection	of	the	Telnet	service	to	be	the	focus	of	this	paper	was	due	to	the	following	main	two	reasons:	 
1. (1)		The	number	of	connections	is	very	large	for	manual	analysis.	Therefore,	focused	cases	with	good	diversity	of	attack	scenarios	criteria	has	led	to	the	selection	of	the	Telnet	service	(as	shown	in	Tables	6	and	9),	 
2. (2)		The	Telnet	service	contributed	to	12	out	of	13	content-based	features.	Therefore,	it	was	a	reasonable	service	to	focus	on	to	determine	the	logic	of	the	generation	process	of	these	features	(see	Table	7),	 
The ﬁrst row of Table 9 shows that there are over 50% of Telnet records in KDD with
a unique key. That means every record within that 50% has a distinct key that identiﬁes
this record alone. This gives us a good probability for one-to-one matching of Telnet
connections between KDD and DARPA.
The last row of Table 9 shows that there are 45% of Telnet connections with the
same key. Most of these are the neptune and portsweep attack connections, where
they share the same matching key value. Appendix A presents an example of some
successful mapping of the Telnet attack connections.
We have used the term collision to determine the number of records each key will
map to. For example, a key with a collision degree of 3, would mean there are three
records which have the same key (duration, src_bytes, dst_bytes).
Throughout our analysis, two out of the 53guess_passwd attacks in KDDdid notmap to
any of DARPA’s attacks. The mapping key (0,126,179) aggregated 40/53 guess_passwd
KDD connectionswhichwere successfullymapped to 38 connections in DARPAwith the same
key. The remaining two connections did not even partially map to any connection.
Table 10 presents the number of connections for every TCP service in KDD. It also
shows the percentage of the uniquely identiﬁable connections among all connections of
a certain service. As it can be seen, only X11, IRC, smtp and telnet services have
more than 50% of their connections are uniquely identiﬁable using the Key[dura-
tion, src_bytes, dst_bytes]. Services lik h tp_2784 nd pm_dump have very
small n mber of connections to be attractiv for this investigation.
As a result, the selection of the Telnet service to be the focus of this paper was due to
the following main two reasons:
(1) The number of connections is very large for manual analysis. Therefore, focused
cases with good diversity of attack scenarios criteria has led to the selection of the
Telnet service (as shown in Tables 6 and 9),
(2) The Telnet service contributed to 12 out of 13 content-based features. Therefore,
it was a reasonable service to focus on to determine the logic of the generation
process of these features (see Table 7),
Note that themain aimof this study is not to ﬁndproblemswith Telnet connections, rather
it investigates the process adopted in the KDD generation that was used to engineer the
features set. Telnet connections were used as an example to illustrate many problems in the
adopted extraction process and the engineering of many of the KDD’s features. Choosing
Table 9. Key-collision of telnet connections in KDD.
No. of Keys Collision Degree Coverage
2173 1 50.81%
23 2 1.08%
3 3 0.21%
3 4 0.28%
1 5 0.12%
1 7 0.16%
1 9 0.21%
1 11 0.26%
1 40 0.94%
1 1965 45.94%
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	Note	that	the	main	aim	of	this	study	is	not	to	find	problems	with	Telnet	connections,	rather	it	investigates	the	process	adopted	in	the	KDD	generation	that	was	used	to	engineer	the	features	set.	Telnet	connections	were	used	as	an	example	to	illustrate	many	problems	in	the	adopted	extraction	process	and	the	engineering	of	many	of	the	KDD’s	features.	Choosing	connections	with	their	Content-based	features	set	to	values	greater	than	zero	was	the	main	selection	criteria.	As	these	small,	randomly	picked	connections	have	shown	so	many	problems,	there	are	no	guarantees	that	similar	ones	do	not	exist	in	many	other	connections	types	as	well,	especially	services	that	trigger	these	content-based	features.	The	approach	and	method	presented	in	this	study	can	be	extended	for	other	connections	of	other	services	to	link	them	to	their	original	sources	in	DARPA	and	be	investigated,	evaluated	and	analysed.	 
connections with their Content-based features set to values greater than zero was the main
s lection criteria. As thes small, randomly picked connec ions hav shown so many pro-
blems, there re no guarantees that simil r ones do not exist inmany other connections types
Table 10. KDD TCP services and their connections counts along with their uniquely identiﬁable
proportions.
Service Number of Connections Percentage of Uniquely Identiﬁable Connections
http_2784 1 100.00%
X11 135 74.07%
IRC 521 68.71%
pm_dump 5 60.00%
smtp 96,554 59.80%
telnet 4277 50.81%
ftp 5214 41.10%
pop_3 1981 24.03%
http 623,091 19.88%
ﬁnger 6891 8.42%
other 16,498 3.15%
auth 3382 1.98%
domain 1113 1.17%
imap4 1069 0.75%
time 1579 0.70%
gopher 1077 0.65%
ssh 1075 0.65%
shell 1051 0.57%
bgp 1047 0.38%
discard 1059 0.38%
echo 1059 0.38%
login 1045 0.38%
nntp 1059 0.38%
uucp 1041 0.38%
csnet_ns 1051 0.29%
exec 1045 0.29%
rje 1070 0.28%
uucp_path 1057 0.28%
whois 1073 0.28%
Z39_50 1078 0.19%
ctf 1068 0.19%
hostnames 1050 0.19%
iso_tsap 1052 0.19%
link 1069 0.19%
mtp 1076 0.19%
name 1067 0.19%
netbios_ssn 1055 0.19%
netstat 1056 0.19%
pop_2 1055 0.19%
printer 1045 0.19%
remote_job 1073 0.19%
sql_net 1052 0.19%
supdup 1060 0.19%
systat 1056 0.19%
vmnet 1053 0.19%
courier 1021 0.10%
efs 1042 0.10%
http_443 1044 0.10%
klogin 1050 0.10%
kshell 1040 0.10%
nnsp 1038 0.10%
sunrpc 1056 0.09%
private 1,024,316 0.05%
aol 2 0.00%
ldap 1041 0.00%
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	The	matching	process	is	in	two	steps.	The	first	pass	will	match	records	between	DARPA	and	KDD	using	the	Key[duration,	src_bytes,	dst_bytes].	Therefore,	all	records	between	the	two	datasets	that	have	the	same	combination	of	values	for	these	fields	will	be	added	to	the	matched	set	(Successfully	mapped).	The	second	pass	will	attempt	to	match	the	remaining	(none-matched)	connections	using	Key[src_bytes,	dst_bytes]	(partial	matching).	The	matched	records	at	this	stage	will	be	added	to	the	possible	matched	set	(partially	mapped).	After	the	completion	of	the	matching	phase,	selected	cases	were	used	for	manual	analysis.	The	details	of	the	matching	process	is	as	follows:	 
Step	1.	Process	every	PCAP	file	in	DARPA	training	dataset	using	Bro	to	produce	a	list	of	mapping	keys	(Key[duration,	src	bytes,	dst	bytes])	for	every	Telnet	connection	and	extract	their	payloads	(Algorithm	1	in	Figure	1).	 
Step	2.	Process	KDD	training	dataset	to	produce	a	list	of	mapping	keys	(Key[duration,	src_bytes,	dst_bytes])	for	every	Telnet	connection	(Algorithm	2	in	Figure	2).	 
Step	3.	Compare	the	sets	of	mapping	keys	between	the	two	datasets	as	detailed	in	Algorithm	3	(Figure	3),	by	performing	the	following	two	phases:	 
●	Phase	1	Compare	all	mapping	keys	between	the	two	lists	(MKD	and	MKK),	if	any	two	keys	match	each	other,	then	they	will	be	added	to	the	match	list	and	be	removed	from	their	respective	lists	 
●	Phase	2	Perform	a	partial	comparison	for	the	remaining	mapping	keys	after	the	removal	of	the	matched	ones.	This	comparison	will	compare	the	mapping	keys	partially	(Key[src_bytes,	dst_bytes]).	If	any	two	keys	match	each	other,	then	they	will	be	added	to	the	partially	matched	list	and	be	removed	from	their	respective	lists.	 
Step	4.	Perform	manual	analysis	of	the	matched	connections	by	comparing	the	payload	of	multiple	connections	–	from	DARPA	PCAPs	–	and	identifying	possible	patterns	that	contributed	to	the	setting	of	the	features	–	as	pro-	vided	by	KDD.	This	was	done	by	selecting	a	number	of	connections	that	have	their	content-based	feature	(Fi	in	{F10…F22})	is	set	to	a	value	greater	than	0.	Then,	based	on	the	definition	of	that	feature,	we	performed	a	manual	and	rigorous	analysis	to	identify	all	possible	patterns	from	those	connections	that	have	contributed	to	this	feature.	Based	on	this	analysis	we	were	able	to	identify	many	irregularities	in	feature	values	between	similar	–	in	terms	of	payload	–	connections.		
as well, especially services that trigger these content-based features. The approach and
method presented in this study can be extended for other connections of other services to
link them to their original sources in DARPA and be investigated, evaluated and analysed.
The matching process is in two steps. The ﬁrst pass will match records between
DARPA and KDD using the Key[duration, src_bytes, dst_bytes]. Therefore,
all records between the two datasets that have the same combination of values
for these ﬁelds will be added to the matched set (Successfully mapped). The
second pass will attempt to match the remaining (none-matched) connections using
Key[src_bytes, dst_bytes] (partial matching). The matched records at this
stage will be added to the possible matched set (partially mapped). After the
completion of the matching phase, selected cases were used for manual analysis.
The details of the matching process is as follows:
Step 1. Process every PCAP ﬁle in DARPA training dataset using Bro to produce a list
of mapping keys (Key[duration, src bytes, dst bytes]) for every
Telnet connection and extract their payloads (Algorithm 1 in Figure 1).
Step 2. Process KDD training dataset to produce a list of mapping keys (Key[dura-
tion, src_bytes, dst_bytes]) for every Telnet connection (Algorithm
2 in Figure 2).
Step 3. Compare the sets of mapping keys between the two datasets as detailed in
Algorithm 3 (Figure 3), by performing the following two phases:
● Phase 1 Compare all mapping keys between the two lists (MKD and MKK), if any
two keys match each other, then they will be added to the match list and be
removed from their respective lists
● Phase 2 Perform a partial comparison for the remaining mapping keys after the
removal of the matched ones. This comparison will compare the mapping keys
partially (Key[src_bytes, dst_bytes]). If any two keys match each other,
Figure 1. Algorithm 1 – DARPA pre-processing.
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	4.2.	Phase	2	–	analysing	connection	contents	 Applying	this	matching	technique,	we	extracted	the	actual	content	(command	and	response	sequences)	of	these	connections	and	analysed	them	manually.	We	attempted	to	extract	the	relevant	patterns	depending	on	the	available	documentation	that,	we	believed,	will	have	an	effect	on	the	content	features	(10–22).	Based	on	this	analysis,	as	will	be	shown	in	the	coming	sections,	we	were	able	to	detect	a	great	deal	of	inconsistencies	in	the	feature	generation	process	in	the	original	KDD.			5.	Feature	analysis	 In	this	section	we	present	all	the	inconsistencies	that	have	been	detected	in	every	feature	examined	in	these	two	experiments.	Also	we	provide,	where	appropriate,	a	better	explanation	of	those	features	that	were	poorly	described	in	the	KDD	documentation	based	on	our	observations	of	the	linked	connections	with	DARPA.		5.1.	Basic	features	 5.1.1.	duration	(feature	1)	We	have	identified	many	irregularities	affecting	this	feature	in	KDD.	It	represents	the	duration	of	a	connection,	in	seconds,	from	start	to	end.	In	a	TCP	connection,	this	represents	the	period	between	the	first	and	last	packet	within	a	single	connection.	But	in	ICMP	connections,	all	durations	are	zero,	because	KDD	has	treated	every	ICMP	packet	as	a	single	connection.	 Studying	this	feature	within	the	Telnet	connections,	we	were	able	to	detect	that	some	Telnet	connections	in	KDD	have	a	shorter	duration	than	their	equivalent	connection	in	DARPA.	After	investigating	this	issue,	we	have	found	that	if	a	TCP	connection	is	attempted,	where	multiple	SYN	packets	were	sent	at	the	handshake	stage,	only	the	last	SYN	packet	was	used	to	mark	the	start	time	of	this	connection.	This	makes	the	total	duration	shorter	by	the	difference	between	the	first	and	last	SYN	packets	in	this	phase.	 Another	observation	was	that	some	Telnet	sessions,	especially	the	long	ones,	were	assigned	a	duration	of	zero	in	KDD.	There	was	no	explanation	in	the	KDD	documentation	of	these	cases.	The	following	table	(Table	11)	shows	some	examples,	out	of	over	100	mapped	cases	between	KDD	and	DARPA,	with	a	difference	in	durations.	The	features	values	of	src_bytes	and	dst_bytes	in	both	datasets	were	the	same	for	these	cases,	and	allowed	us	to	match	the	records	partially.	This	will	affect	the	learning	capability	of	ML	algorithms.	 
 
then they will be added to the partially matched list and be removed from their
respective lists.
Step 4. Perform manual analysis of the matched connections by comp ring h
payload of multiple conn ctions – from DARPA PCAPs – and identifying
possible patterns that contributed to the setting of the features – as pro-
vided by KDD. This was done by selecting a number of connections that
have their content-based feature (Fi 2 F10 ! ! ! F22f g) is set to a value greater
than 0. Then, based on the deﬁnition of that feature, we performed a manual
and rigorous analysis to identify all possible patterns from those connections
that have contributed to this feature. Based on this analysis we were able to
identify many irregularities in feature values between similar – in terms of
payload – connections.
4.2. Phase 2 – analysing connection contents
Applying this matching technique, we extracted the actual content (command and
response sequences) of these connections and analysed them manually. We attempted
to extract the relevant patterns depending on the available documentation that, we
believed, will have an eﬀect on the content features (10–22). Based on this analysis, as
will be shown in the coming sections, we were able to detect a great deal of incon-
sistencies in the feature generation process in the original KDD.
5. Feature analysis
In this section we present all the inconsistencies that have been detected in every
feature examined in these two experiments. Also we provide, where appropriate, a
better explanation of those features that were poorly described in the KDD documenta-
tion based on our observations of the linked connections with DARPA.
Figure 2. Algorithm 2 – KDD pre-processing.
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 5.1.2.	wrong_fragments	(feature	8)	Bro	does	not	detect	all	fragmented	packets	as	it	does	packet	reassembling	before	passing	them	onto	it’s	event	handler.	However,	Bro	documentation	[25],	does	note	what	it	terms	‘weird’	connections	whenever	a	fragment	with	certain	criteria	is	detected,	such	as	an	excessively	small	fragment	or	fragment	overlap.	There	are	eight	cases	that	Bro	regards	as	fragment	problems	and	raises	an	event	(conn_weird)	to	report	them	[Bro	25].	It	is	not	clear	how	KDD	has	dealt	with	this	problem	and	whether	the	developers	have	used	Bro	or	some	other	tool	to	report	wrong	fragments.	 5.2.	Content	features	 5.2.1.	hot	(feature	10)	According	to	the	KDD	documentation	[3]	and	Stolfo	et	al.	[4],	this	feature	represents	the	number	of	hot	indicators.	Lee	et	al.	[5–7]	has	explained	this	as	an	access	to	a	system	directory	or	a	creation	or	execution	of	a	program.	It	is	not	clear	what	folders	are	considered	as	system	directories.	In	our	manual	checking	for	what	patterns	could	increment	this	feature,	we	found	many	inconsistencies.	For	instance,	one	of	these	irregularities	were	caused	by	–	but	not	limited	to-	Program	compilation	with	the	GCC	command,	which	sometimes	increments	this	feature	count	and	sometimes	does	not.	Therefore,	we	could	not	accurately	determine	the	logic	for	this	feature’s	computation.	 
5.1. Basic features
5.1.1. u ati n (feature 1)
We have identiﬁed many irregularities aﬀecting this feature in KDD. It represents the
duration of a connection, in seconds, from start to end. In a TCP connection, this
represents the period between the ﬁrst and last packet within a single connection. But
in ICMP connections, all durations are zero, because KDD has treated every ICMP packet
as a single connection.
Studying this feature within the Telnet connections, we were able to detect that some
Telnet connections in KDD have a shorter duration than their equivalent connection in
DARPA. After investigating this issue, we have found that if a TCP connection is
Figure 3. Algorithm 3 – Match records using mapping keys between KDD and DARPA.
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  	For	example,	in	the	following	mapped	connection	(1,446,934),	in	Table	12,	there	were	four	calls	to	‘/bin/gcc’	command,	but	KDD	shows	only	three	hot	actions.	Although	connection	(1,446,934)	has	almost	the	same	sequence	of	commands	and	the	same	number	of	‘/bin/gcc’	command	calls	as	connection	(3,429,269),	the	former	failed	to	detect	one	of	the	‘/bin/gcc’	command	calls	for	no	clear	reason.	(See	Appendixes	B	and	C	for	actual	content.)	Based	on	the	fact	that	the	DARPA	dataset	was	generated	using		
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		synthetic	traffic	and	readymade	scripts	that	include	predefined	attack	scenarios,	it	will	not	be	surprising	to	see	lots	of	connection	between	different	hosts	at	different	times	with	nearly	the	exact	same	content	and	payload,	which	was	evident	throughout	our	analysis.	Much	of	the	compared	traffic	will	have	nearly	same	payload,	but	with	inconsistently	different	feature	values.	 5.2.2.	num_failed_logins	(feature	11)	This	feature	counts	the	number	of	failed	login	attempts.	In	our	investigation,	we	found	that	it	is	incremented	whenever	the	‘incorrect	login’	string	is	present	in	the	response	message	from	server	to	the	client.	This	means	that	if	this	message	appeared	in	a	normal	response,	such	as	an	email	message	or	SQL	result,	then	this	feature	will	be	incremented.	 Strangely	enough,	we	identified	the	following	case	where	KDD	has	failed	to	increment	this	feature	(Table	13),	even	though	there	were	two	failed	login	attempts	in	this	connection,	as	shown	in	Figure	4.	That	is	because	the	response	was	‘Login	incorrect’	instead	of	‘incorrect	login’.		
 
 5.2.3.	logged_in	(feature	12)	This	feature	is	used	to	indicate	if	a	login	to	service	was	successful	or	not.	This	feature	was	evaluated	by	a	blind	search	for	the	‘last	login’	pattern.	Failure	to	detect	this	pattern	will	result	in	this	feature	not	being	set.	 
Strangely enough, we identiﬁed the following case where KDD has failed to increment
this feature (Table 13), even though there were two failed login attempts in this connec-
tion, as shown in Figure 4. That is because the response was ‘Login incorrect’ instead
of ‘incorrect login’.
5.2.3. logged_in (feature 12)
This feature is used to indicate if a login to service was successful or not. This feature was
evaluated by a blind search for the ‘last login’ pattern. Failure to detect this pattern
will result in this feature not being set.
Table 14 presents some examples; connection (7449) detected a login even though
the ‘last login’ pattern is missing, whereas in connection (3,927,225) login was not
detected because the pattern was missing, even though a successful login took place
(see Appendixes D and E for actual content).
5.2.4. lnum_compromised (feature 13)
According to Lee et al. [5–7], this feature represent counts of error messages, such as,
‘not found’ or ‘Jump to’ instructions. Our analysis has found that some connections
have ‘Command not found’ and ‘No such ﬁle or directory’ errors, but they did
not contribute to this feature’s calculation.
Table 15 shows that in connection (4,810,953), KDD has counted the ‘no such ﬁle
or directory’ pattern as a compromising case. Whereas in connection (805,010) the
system has failed to detect this pattern but it was incremented for some other pattern.
5.2.5. lroot_shell (feature 14)
According the KDD documentation, this feature is set when a user achieved a root
access to the shell. This is triggered when the terminal’s prompt settings change. For
example, a change from
‘user@systemName ~ $’ to ‘systemName ~ #’ indicates the user has escalated
privilege to root level. This can be useful to detect user-to-root (U2R) attacks. In our
observations we found that KDD has used a very simple check to detect this pattern. The
KDD generation process checked that if a server response line starts with a ‘#’ character then
Table 12. Two mapped telnet connections with similar command sequences and diﬀerent counts of
hot features.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(10)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
1,446,934 53 2628 3860 3 53 23,070 23 192.168.1.10 172.16.112.50 week4_friday
3,429,269 49 2402 3939 4 49 15,374 23 197.182.91.233 172.16.112.50 week5_wednesday
Table 13. Mapped telnet connection with wrong num_failed_logins values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(11)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
1,391,134 60 90 233 0 60 1026 23 207.230.54.203 172.16.114.50 week4_tuesday
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Strangely enough, we identiﬁed the following case where KDD has failed to increment
this feature (Table 13), even though there were two failed login attempts in this connec-
tion, as shown in Figure 4. That is because the response was ‘Login incorrect’ instead
of ‘incorrect login’.
5.2.3. logged_in (feature 12)
This feature is used to indicate if a login to service was successful or not. This feature was
evaluated by a blind search for the ‘last login’ pattern. Failure to detect this pattern
will result in this feature not being set.
Table 14 presents some examples; connection (7449) detected a login even though
the ‘last login’ pattern is missing, whereas in connection (3,927,225) login was not
detected because the pattern was missing, even though a successful login took place
(see Appendixes D and E for actual content).
5.2.4. lnum_compromised (feature 13)
According to Lee et al. [5–7], this feature represent counts of error messages, such as,
‘not found’ or ‘Jump to’ instructions. Our analysis has found that some connections
have ‘Command not found’ and ‘No such ﬁle or directory’ errors, but they did
not contribute to this feature’s calculation.
Table 15 shows that in connection (4,810,953), KDD has counted the ‘no such ﬁle
or directory’ pattern as a compromising case. Whereas in connection (805,010) the
system has failed to detect this pattern but it was incremented for some other pattern.
5.2.5. lroot_shell (feature 14)
According the KDD documentation, this feature is set when a user achieved a root
access to the shell. This is triggered when the terminal’s prompt settings change. For
example, a change from
‘user@systemName ~ $’ to ‘systemName ~ #’ indicates the user has escalated
privilege to root level. This can be useful to detect user-to-root (U2R) attacks. In our
observations we found that KDD has used a very simple check to detect this pattern. The
KDD generation process checked that if a server response line starts with a ‘#’ character then
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it considers that a root shell has been obtained. However, the detection of such a pattern
was not always consistent as many ﬂaws has been detected throughout our analysis.
In the following connection (406,471) in Table 16, a root shell was obtained, but the
KDD generation script has failed to detect it (see Appendix F for actual content).
These inconsistences in detecting patterns might indicate that KDD has used multiple
scripts with diﬀerent logic in their generation process. That is because – as presented
throughout this paper- a pattern will increment a feature in one connection, but it fails
to do so in another one, even though same command was executed.
Figure 4. Content of telnet connection (KDD No. 1,391,134) with two failed login attempts.
Table 14. Mapped telnet connections with wrong calculation of logged_in feature.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(12)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
7449 184 1511 2957 1 184 1941 23 135.8.60.182 172.16.112.50 week1_monday
3,927,225 85 277 693 0 85 20,504 23 197.218.177.69 172.16.113.50 week5_friday
Table 16. Mapped telnet connections with wrong lroot_shell values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(14)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
406,471 150 1,587 6,707 0 150 25,134 23 202.247.224.89 172.16.112.50 week3_monday
Table 15. Mapped telnet connections with wrong lnum_compromised values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(13)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
4,810,953 61 2,336 4,194 1 61 4728 23 199.174.194.16 172.16.112.50 week6_thursday
805,010 60 2,328 4,551 1 60 23,147 23 206.47.98.151 172.16.112.50 week7_tuesday
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Table	14	presents	some	examples;	connection	(7449)	detected	a	login	even	though	the	‘last	login’	pattern	is	missing,	whereas	in	connection	(3,927,225)	login	was	not	detected	because	the	pattern	was	missing,	even	though	a	successful	login	took	place	(see	Appendixes	D	and	E	for	actual	content).		
 5.2.4.	lnum_compromised	(feature	13)	According	to	Lee	et	al.	[5–7],	this	feature	represents	counts	of	error	messages,	such	as,	‘not	found’	or	‘Jump	to’	instructions.	Our	analysis	has	found	that	some	connections	have	‘Command	not	found’	and	‘No	such	file	or	directory’	errors,	but	they	did	not	contribute	to	this	feature’s	calculation.	 Table	15	shows	that	in	connection	(4,810,953),	KDD	has	counted	the	‘no	such	file	or	directory’	pattern	as	a	compromising	case.	Whereas	in	connection	(805,010)	the	system	has	failed	to	detect	this	pattern	but	it	was	incremented	for	some	other	pattern.		
 5.2.5.	lroot_shell	(feature	14)	According	the	KDD	documentation,	this	feature	is	set	when	a	user	achieved	a	root	access	to	the	shell.	This	is	triggered	when	the	terminal’s	prompt	settings	change.	For	example,	a	change	from	 ‘user@systemName	~	$’	to	‘systemName	~	#’	indicates	the	user	has	escalated	privilege	to	root	level.	This	can	be	useful	to	detect	user-to-root	(U2R)	attacks.	In	our	observations	we	found	that	KDD	has	used	a	very	simple	check	to	detect	this	pattern.	The	KDD	generation	process	checked	that	if	a	server	response	line	starts	with	a	‘#’	character	then	it	considers	that	a	root	shell	has	been	obtained.	However,	the	detection	of	such	a	pattern	was	not	always	consistent	as	many	flaws	has	been	detected	throughout	our	analysis.	 In	the	following	connection	(406,471)	in	Table	16,	a	root	shell	was	obtained,	but	the	KDD	generation	script	has	failed	to	detect	it	(see	Appendix	F	for	actual	content).	 These	inconsistences	in	detecting	patterns	might	indicate	that	KDD	has	used	multiple	scripts	with	different	logic	in	their	generation	process.	That	is	because	–	as	presented	throughout	this	paper-	a	pattern	will	increment	a	feature	in	one	connection,	but	it	fails	to	do	so	in	another	one,	even	though	same	command	was	executed.	 5.2.6.	lnum_root	(feature	16)	This	feature	counts	the	number	of	occurrences	of	a	‘root’	term	within	a	connection’s	payload.	Our	investigation	has	exposed	many	inconsistencies	with	this.	We	have	identified	connections	that	count	the	number	of	occurrences	of	the	word	‘root’,	while	other	connections	would	count	the	number	of	lines	that	contained	‘root’.	In	some	other	cases,	we	were	not	able	to	match	the	counts	with	any	of	those	choices.	 
it considers that a root shell has been obtained. However, the detection of such a pattern
was not always consistent as many ﬂaws has been detected throughout our analysis.
In the following connection (406,471) in Table 16, a root shell was obtained, but the
KDD generation script has failed to detect it (see Appendix F for actual content).
These inconsistences in detecting patterns might indicate that KDD has used multiple
scripts with diﬀerent logic in their generation process. That is because – as presented
throughout this paper- a pattern will increment a feature in one connection, but it fails
to do so i another on , ev n though same command was executed.
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Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
4,810,953 61 2,336 4,194 1 61 4728 23 199.174.194.16 172.16.112.50 week6_thursday
805,010 60 2,328 4,551 1 60 23,147 23 206.47.98.151 172.16.112.50 week7_tuesday
JOURNAL OF CYBER SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 19
it considers that a root shell has been obtained. However, the detection of such a pattern
was not always consistent as many ﬂaws has been detected throughout our analysis.
In the following connection (406,471) in Table 16, a root shell was obtained, but the
KDD generation script has failed to detect it (see Appendix F for actual content).
These inconsistences in detecting patterns might indicate that KDD has used multiple
scripts with diﬀerent logic in their generation process. That is because – as presented
throughout this paper- a pattern will increment a feature in one connection, but it fails
to do so in another one, even though same command was executed.
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Treating	this	feature	as	a	count	is	not	sensible,	as	some	connections	will	contain	a	large	number	of	words	whereas	the	number	of	occurrences	of	this	term	does	not	present	a	good	indicator	of	anything.	For	example,	Table	17	lists	a	single	connection	(1,401,653)	which	maps	to	a	connection	in	DARPA	with	over	7468	‘root’	terms.	However,	after	checking	the	payload,	we	found	that	all	these	terms	appeared	as	a	response	to	a	directory	content	listing	command	(ls).	In	these	responses,	the	‘root’	term	was	identifying	the	user	and	group	of	those	listed	files.	Using	a	frequency	measure	could	have	been	a	better	indicator.	 In	two	other	cases	shown	in	Table	17,	connection	(3,682,786)	used	the	number	of	lines,	four	lines	in	this	case,	where	the	‘root’	pattern	has	appeared	although	there	were	actually	six	patterns.	Connection	(841,798)	used	the	number	of	occurrences	of	the	pattern,	three	‘root’	patterns,	instead	of	the	number	of	lines	(two	lines).	We	were	also	able	to	identify	cases	where	neither	pattern	occurrences	nor	the	number	of	lines	were	used	to	set	this	feature’s	value.	Connection	(1,401,653)	is	an	example	of	this;	it	had	8332	repetitions	of	‘root’	and	7476	lines	with	this	pattern,	but	the	value	it	had	is	7468	that	matches	neither	of	these	figures.		
 5.2.7.	lnum_file_creations	(feature	17)	Lee	et	al.	[5–7],	Stolfo	et	al.	[4],	and	KDD	[3]	have	described	this	feature	as	the	number	of	file	creation	attempts.	Our	examination	has	linked	commands,	such	as,	‘vi’,	‘cp’,	‘chmod’,	‘rm’	and	‘cat	>’	to	this	feature.	But	there	is	no	sign	of	addressing	any	other	commands,	such	as,	‘gcc’,	‘mv’,	‘mkdir’,	‘touch’,	etc.	.	..	 For	example,	connection	(841,798)	in	Table	18	has	two	‘chmod’,	one	‘cat	>’,	one	‘cp’	and	one	‘rm’	commands,	but	only	four	of	them	where	counted.	In	some	other	cases,	some	of	these	commands	are	not	considered,	while	in	others	they	are.	This	presents	the	vagueness	of	this	transformation	process,	as	it	is	not	clear	which	measure	was	used	for	this	metric;	number	of	different	commands	or	number	of	their	calls.	 5.2.8.	lnum_shells	(feature	18)	Our	analysis	has	revealed	that	this	feature	is	incremented	by	the	detection	of	any	of	the	shell	command	patterns,	such	as,	‘/bin/sh’,	‘/bin/bash’,	‘/bin/csh’	or	‘/bin/	tcsh’.	It	is	not	clear	if	other	patterns	are	considered	or	not,	as	further	investigation	is	required.	Even	with	this,	connections	in	KDD	have	failed	to	count	the	occurrences	of	such	patterns	correctly.	For	example,	connection	(3,927,225)	in	Table	19	has	two	occurrences	of	‘/bin/sh’	pattern,	but	none	of	them	were	detected.	 5.2.9.	lnum_outbound_cmds	(feature	20)	Although,	Lee	et	al.	[5–7],	Stolfo	et	al.	[4]	and	KDD	[3]	have	described	this	feature	as	the	number	of	outbound	commands	or	connections	within	an	FTP	session,	this	feature	has	never	been	set	as	it	is	always	a	zero	value	in	KDD	with	all	services	on	all	protocols.	Therefore,	we	were	not	able	to	determine	any	link	to	patterns	that	might	affect	it.	This	also	raises	more	concerns	about	the	contribution	of	this	feature	to	the	learning	capability	of	ML	algorithms.	 
5.2.6. lnum_root (feature 16)
This feature counts the number of occurrences of a ‘root’ term within a connection’s
payload. Our investigation has exposed many inconsistencies with this. We have identiﬁed
connections that count the number of occurrences of the word ‘root’, while other connec-
tions would count the number of lines that contained ‘root’. In some other cases, we were
not able to match the counts with any of those choices.
Treating this feature as a count is not sensible, as some connections will contain a large
number of words whereas the number of occurrences of this term does not present a good
indicator of anything. For example, Table 17 lists a single connection (1,401,653) which maps
to a connection in DARPA with over 7468 ‘root’ terms. However, after checking the payload,
we found that all these terms appeared as a response to a directory content listing command
(ls). In these responses, the ‘root’ term was identifying the user and group of those listed ﬁles.
Using a frequency measure could have been a better indicator.
In two other cases shown in Table 17, connection (3,682,786) used the number of lines, four
lines in this case, where the ‘root’ pattern has appeared although there were actually six
patterns. Connection (841,798) used the number of occurrences of the pattern, three ‘root’
patterns, instead of the number of lines (two lines). We were also able to identify cases where
neither pattern occurrences nor the number of lines were used to set this feature’s value.
Connection (1,401,653) is an example of this; it had 8332 repetitions of ‘root’ and 7476 lines
with this pattern, but the value it had is 7468 that matches neither of these ﬁgures.
5.2.7. lnum_ﬁle_cre tions (feature 17)
Lee et al. [5–7], Stolfo et al. [4], and KDD [3] have described this feature as the number of
ﬁle creation attempts. Our examination has linked commands, such as, ‘vi’, ‘cp’,
‘chmod’, ‘rm’ and ‘cat >’ to this feature. But there is no sign of addressing any other
commands, such as, ‘gcc’, ‘mv’, ‘mkdir’, ‘touch’, etc. . ..
For example, connection (841,798) in Table 18 has two ‘chmod’, one ‘cat >’, one ‘cp’
and one ‘rm’ commands, but only four of them where counted. In some other cases,
some of these commands are not considered, while in others they are. This presents the
vagueness of this transformation process, as it is not clear which measure was used for
this metric; number of diﬀerent commands or number of their calls.
Table 18. Mapped telnet connection with wrong lnum_ﬁle_creations values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(17)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
841,798 103 302 8,876 4 103 9850 23 209.12.13.144 172.16.113.50 week7_wednesday
Table 17. Mapped telnet connections with wrong lnum_root values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes F(16)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
3,682,786 290 415 70,529 4 290 32,612 23 206.48.44.18 172.16.112.50 week5_friday
841,798 103 302 8,876 3 103 9850 23 209.12.13.144 172.16.113.50 week7_wednesday
1,401,653 5328 1,604 920,608 7468 5328 2636 23 209.12.13.144 172.16.112.50 week4_wednesday
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	5.2.10.	is_host_login	(feature	21)	This	feature	in	Lee	et	al.	[5–7],	and	KDD	[3]	is	named	as	‘is_hot_login’,	but	in	the	machine	readable	form	file	on	KDD	website	it	was	labelled	as	‘is_host_login’.	It	is	basically	set	to	one	if	a	‘root’	username	is	used	to	login	into	the	system.	This	feature	is	not	affected,	strangely	enough,	by	switch	user	(su	-)	attempts	using	root	accounts.	 For	example,	the	following	connection	(1,381,226)	in	Table	20	contains	a	‘su’	call,	where	a	root	privilege	is	gained,	but	this	feature	has	not	been	incremented.	 5.3.	Connection	based	attributes	[features	32–41)	 The	calculation	process	of	these	features	was	not	explained	in	a	clear	way,	which	resulted	in	misconceptions	among	researchers.	Such	confusion	was	evident	by	15,	when	they	explained	the	slow	probing	attack	and	how	the	KDD’s	connection	features	were	constructed	to	solve	this	problem.	‘To	solve	this	problem,	the	“same	host”	and	“same	service”	features	are	re-calculated	but	based	on	the	connection	window	of	100	connections	rather	than	a	time	window	of	2	s.’	(15]	 Looking	carefully	at	the	explanation	of	Stolfo	et	al.	[4],	and	Lee	et	al.	[5–7]	a	separate	and	more	confusing	process	will	emerge.	Their	explanation	of	the	construction	process	was	as	follows:	 “We	sorted	these	connection	records	by	the	destination	hosts,	and	applied	the	same	pattern	mining	and	feature	construction	process.	[Rather	than|Instead	of]	using	a	time	window	of	2	seconds,	we	now	used	a	“connection”	window	of	100	connections,	and	constructed	a	mirror	set	of	“host-based	traffic”	features	as	the	(time-based)	“traffic”	features.”	 The	following	figure	(Figure	5)	presents	this	latter	description.	Where	two	flaws	can	be	seen	very	clearly	in	this	process.		
 
5.2.8. lnum_shells (feature 18)
Our analysis has revealed that this feature is incremented by the detection of any of the
shell command patterns, such as, ‘/bin/sh’, ‘/bin/bash’, ‘/bin/csh’ or ‘/bin/
tcsh’. It is not clear if other patterns are considered or not, as further investigation is
required. Even with this, connections in KDD have failed to count the occurrences of
such patterns correctly. For example, connection (3,927,225) in Table 19 has two
occurrences of ‘/bin/sh’ pattern, but none of them were detected.
5.2.9. lnum_outbound_cmds (feature 20)
Although, Lee et al. [5–7], Stolfo et al. [4] and KDD [3] have described this feature as the
number of outbound commands or connections within an FTP session, this feature has never
been set as it is always a zero value in KDDwith all services on all protocols. Therefore, wewere
not able to determine any link to patterns that might aﬀect it. This also raises more concerns
about the contribution of this feature to the learning capability of ML algorithms.
5.2.10. is_host_login (feature 21)
This feature in Lee et al. [5–7], and KDD [3] is named as ‘is_hot_login’, but in the
machine readable form ﬁle on KDD website it was labelled as ‘is_host_login’. It is
basically set to one if a ‘root’ username is used to login into the system. This feature is
not aﬀected, strangely enough, by switch user (su -) attempts using root accounts.
For example, the following connection (1,381,226) in Table 20 contains a ‘su’ call,
where a root privilege is gained, but this feature has not been incremented.
5.3. Connection based attributes [features 32 –41)
The calculation process of these features was not explained in a clear way, which resulted in
misconceptions among researchers. Such confusion was evident by 15, when they explained
the slow probing attack and how the KDD’s connection features were constructed to solve
this problem. ‘To solve this problem, the “same host” and “same service” features are re-calculated
but based on the connection window of 100 connections rather than a time window of 2 s.’ (15]
Looking carefully at the explanation of Stolfo et al. [4], and Lee et al. [5–7] a separate
and more confusing process will emerge. Their explanation of the construction process
was as follows:
Table 20. Mapped telnet connection with wrong is_host_login values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(21)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP Simulation Day
1,381,226 337 237 1,540 0 337 13,114 23 208.254.251.132 172.16.112.50 week4_tuesday
Table 19. Mapped telnet connection with wrong lnum_shells values.
KDD DARPA
Connection
No.
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Bytes
Dest.
Bytes
F
(18)
Duration
(sec)
Src.
Port
Dest.
Port Src. IP Dest. IP
Simulation
Day
3,927,225 85 277 693 0 85 20,504 23 197.218.177.69 172.16.113.50 week5_friday
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“We sorted these connection records by the destination hosts, and applied the same
pattern mining and feature construction process. [Rather than|Instead of] using a time window
of 2 seconds, we now used a “connection” window of 100 connections, and constructed a
mirror set of “host-based traﬃc” features as the (time-based) “traﬃc” feat res.”
The following ﬁgure (Figure 5 ) presents this latter description. Where two ﬂaws can be
seen very clearly in this process.
The ﬁrst puzzle in this process is the purpose of sorting connections by destination and
no reasonable answer can be provided. For example, what does an early connection to
server C or D have to dowith later connections to server A and/or B depending onwhere the
earliest 100th connection lies? Also, how does the order of destination servers determine the
relationship between connections? This is because the main purpose of constructing these
features is to detect a slow probing attack, but as the explanation of this process shows, the
time sequence of these connections is distorted by this sorting step.
If we assumed that the authors were looking at connections to each destination server
separately, then a second puzzle will arise. For instance, if we had to analyse the last 100
connections to server B alone, then why would we compute the features that are related to
the same destination host, (dst_host_count (32), dst_host_same_srv_rate (34), dst_host_-
diﬀ_srv_rate (35), dst_host_same_src_port_rate (36), dst_host_srv_diﬀ_host_rate (37), dst_host_-
serror_rate (38), dst_host_rerror_rate(40)), s the curr nt connection? In this situation all the
100 connectio s are g ing to same server a d it is not reasonable to compute the rate of
connections that are going to this host.
These Connection-based attributes in KDD already present counts and rates of con-
nections to diﬀerent destination hosts. This means that these counts were crossing
betwee server groups. So, organising connections into server blocks is illogical.
If these scepticisms are justiﬁed, there is still one major ﬂaw here. Stolfo et al. [4 ] and Lee
et al. [5 –7 ] have claimed that the last 100 connections were examined in the construction of
these features. Therefore, in the worst case scenario, all these connections will go to the same
destination host and/or the same service, which will result in having counts of features 32 and
Figure 5. Representation of sorted connections by their destination hosts.
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The	first	puzzle	in	this	process	is	the	purpose	of	sorting	connections	by	destination	and	no	reasonable	answer	can	be	provided.	For	example,	what	does	an	early	connection	to	server	C	or	D	have	to	do	with	later	connections	to	server	A	and/or	B	depending	on	where	the	earliest	100th	connection	lies?	Also,	how	does	the	order	of	destination	servers	determine	the	relationship	between	connections?	This	is	because	the	main	purpose	of	constructing	these	features	is	to	detect	a	slow	probing	attack,	but	as	the	explanation	of	this	process	shows,	the	time	sequence	of	these	connections	is	distorted	by	this	sorting	step.	 If	we	assumed	that	the	authors	were	looking	at	connections	to	each	destination	server	separately,	then	a	second	puzzle	will	arise.	For	instance,	if	we	had	to	analyse	the	last	100	connections	to	server	B	alone,	then	why	would	we	compute	the	features	that	are	related	to	the	same	destination	host,	(dst_host_count	(32),	dst_host_same_srv_rate	(34),	dst_host_-	diff_srv_rate	(35),	dst_host_same_src_port_rate	(36),	dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate	(37),	dst_host_-	serror_rate	(38),	dst_host_rerror_rate(40)),	as	the	current	connection?	In	this	situation	all	the	100	connections	are	going	to	same	server	and	it	is	not	reasonable	to	compute	the	rate	of	connections	that	are	going	to	this	host.	 These	Connection-based	attributes	in	KDD	already	present	counts	and	rates	of	con-	nections	to	different	destination	hosts.	This	means	that	these	counts	were	crossing	between	server	groups.	So,	organising	connections	into	server	blocks	is	illogical.	 If	these	scepticisms	are	justified,	there	is	still	one	major	flaw	here.	Stolfo	et	al.	[4]	and	Lee	et	al.	[5–7]	have	claimed	that	the	last	100	connections	were	examined	in	the	construction	of	these	features.	Therefore,	in	the	worst	case	scenario,	all	these	connections	will	go	to	the	same	destination	host	and/or	the	same	service,	which	will	result	in	having	counts	of	features	32	and	33	(dst_host_count	and	dst_host_srv_count)	to	be	of	value	100	at	most.	Our	analysis	has	showed	that,	the	vast	majority	of	these	counts	exceeds	this	value,	up	to	a	recorded	value	of	255.	Figure	6	shows	the	counts	and	percentages	of	such	connections	in	KDD.	 
 Figure	6.	Connection	counts	based	on	features	32	and	33,	with	counts	≤	or	>100. 	6.	Experiment	design	and	tools	 In	these	experiments,	we	have	used	a	server	with	the	following	hardware	specifications,	2U	Supermicro	chassis,	8×	host-swap	2.5”	SAS/SATA	disk	bays,	Supermicro	X8DTU-LN4F	+	motherboard,	Dual	Intel	Xeon	E5620	(quad	core),	24GB	RAM	(6	×	4GB	DDR3	ECC	RDIMM),	4×	1TB	SATA	(RAID10)	and	4×	1Gb	Ethernet.	This	machine	has	Windows	Server	2012	R2	Datacentre	(64-bit)	Operating	System.	 A	virtual	machine	was	created	on	Hyper-V	with	4	Virtual	Processors	and	4	GB	RAM.	This	VM	was	used	to	host	the	SecurityOnion	(12.04.5.1–20,150,205)	operating	system,	which	has	Bro	(2.4),	curl	(7.22.0),	wget	(1.13.4)	and	TShark	(1.6.7)	installed	to	run	these	experiments.	 
Journal of Cyber Security Technology Sept2018 
 
20 
The	reason	to	select	Bro	to	process	the	PCAP	files	was	because	it	was	the	same	tool	used	to	process	these	files	to	generate	KDD.	We	also	used	TShark	to	validate	Bro’s	results	of	TCP	connections,	which	has	led	to	the	configurations	discussed	below.	 We	have	used	bash	scripting	to	download	DARPA	files	(tcpdump.gz	and	tcpdump.list.	gz)	for	every	simulation	day	from	the	training	dataset.	Every	tcpdump.gz	file	was	processed	by	Bro	to	extract	the	basic	features	of	every	Telnet	connection	along	with	their	actual	content.	Every	extracted	connection	was	mapped	to	its	corresponding	attack	class	as	it	appears	in	the	tcpdump.list	file.	After	that,	all	extracted	connections	were	mapped	to	KDD	connections	using	a	Perl	script.	Duration,	source	bytes	and	destination	bytes	were	used	as	matching	keys.	 In	the	development	of	the	Bro	scripts,	we	had	to	set	two	main	parameters	to	be	able	to	extract	long	connections	as	well	as	those	connections	with	multiple	SYN	packets.	For	every	Telnet	connection	a	[set_inactivity_timeout(conn_id,	24.0	hr)]	function	is	called	to	extend	the	timeout.	That	is	because	Bro	by	default	will	timeout	any	TCP	connection	after	five	minutes	if	there	was	no	interaction	between	hosts.	DARPA	has	many	Telnet	connections	that	last	for	long	time	where	keep-alive	packets	are	exchanged	every	2	hours	or	so.		
 Figure	7.	Run	time	–	in	seconds	–	of	Bro	scripts. Another	issue	is	with	Telnet	connections	which	start	with	multiple	SYN	packets.	This	traffic	caused	Bro	to	compute	the	start	time	of	these	connections	in	an	incorrect	way	that	caused	a	miscalculation	of	the	total	connection	duration.	Bro	calculated	the	connection’s	start	time	for	TCP	connections	based	on	the	timestamp	of	the	last	SYN	packet	sent	in	the	hand-shake	phase	before	the	server	responded,	rather	than	the	first	request.	Therefore,	we	solved	this	challenge	by	setting	this	variable	as	this	[redef	tcp_attempt_de-	lay	=	1	min]	because	the	longest	delay	between	SYN	packets	was	50s.	 The	above	figure	(Figure	7)	shows	the	run	time	of	Bro,	in	seconds,	to	process	every	tcpdump	file	in	DARPA.	 7.	Conclusion	 In	this	paper,	we	provide	evidence	of	existing	problems	in	the	generation	process	of	the	KDD	1999	dataset.	This	paper	demonstrated	that	the	KDD	dataset	has	more	attacks	than	what	actually	exists	in	the	DARPA	dataset.	This	suggests	that	a	mislabelling	or	duplication	of	connections	has	taken	place.	The	paper	also	discussed	an	experiment	used	to	determine,	for	the	first	time,	a	linking	technique	between	KDD	and	DARPA	Telnet	connections.	This	experiment	has	resulted	in	noting	miscalculations	on	more	than	one	quarter	of	the	existing	features,	which	mainly	concentrated	in	the	content-based	features.	This	group	of	features	are	aimed	at	profiling	connections	to	detect	attacks	related	to	connection	payloads	such	as	U2R	and	R2L.	Many	ML	algorithms	were	failing	in	detecting	those	two	types	of	attacks.	Our	work	might	shed	some	light	on	the	reality	of	the	generation	process	of	these	features,	which	could	be	one	of	many	potential	causes	of	the	poor	performance	of	these	algorithms	on	these	types	of	attacks.	As	a	result	we	support	
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Brugger’s	[10],request	to	stop	using	the	KDD	dataset	in	any	experiment	due	to	these	evident	flaws.	Researchers	are	encouraged	to	use	more	recent	datasets	for	their	experiments,	such	as	the	Kyoto	datasets	[26],	Sperotto’s	(Twente)	dataset	[27]	and	the	UNSW-NB15	dataset	[28],	etc.	 As	discussed	in	the	literature,	the	main	reason	for	researchers	to	use	this	dataset	is	the	lack	of	an	alternative.	Therefore,	a	regeneration	of	this	dataset,	or	any	newer	one,	requires	six	main	conditions	to	be	satisfied	to	guarantee	experimental	reproducibility,	which	is	a	core	requirement	of	science.	 
●	Normal	experimental	practices:	 
• First,	a	full	documentation	of	the	raw	dataset	(network	traces)	should	be	pro-	vided,	including	environment	settings,	tools	versions	and	parameters,	etc.	 
• Second,	all	scripts,	programs	and	tools	used	in	such	transformation	should	be	made	available	and	well	documented.	 
• Third,	the	raw	dataset	(network	traces)	should	also	be	made	publicly	available,	to	make	the	analysis	of	any	proposed	transformation	easier	and	reproducible.	 
• Fourth,	count	analysis	of	input	(packets,	bytes,	protocols,	attacks,	etc.	.	.)	from	raw	files	should	match	the	output	(processed	data)	results.	 
●	IDS	practices:	 
• Fifth,	transformations	of	network	traffic	should	focus	on	network	level	data	that	can	be	extracted	from	headers	and	avoid	any	processing	at	the	payload	level.	This	is	to	avoid	any	concern	or	limitation	with	the	security	and	encrypted	nature	of	traffic.	Content	analysis	should	be	processed	on	host	level,	where	better	controls	and	enough	information	can	be	found	for	such	tasks.	 
• Generalisedfeaturesforallprotocolsandservicesshouldbeprohibited.Everyfeature	should	reflect	a	known	computational	process.	For	example,	duration	feature	will	be	computed	as	the	time	period	of	connection	with	certain	start	and	end	criteria,	where	this	criteria	might	differ	from	one	protocol	to	another.	Having	a	different	computation	process	or	different	measuring	criteria	for	the	same	features	should	be	prohibited.	Such	inconsistences	were	evident	in	KDD,	especially	in	Content-based	features,	where	we	can	see	that	no	one	clear	and	unified	process	is	used	to	calculate	these	features,	even	within	the	same	protocol	(TCP)	for	the	same	service	(Telnet).	For	example,	the	logged_in	feature	in	Telnet	connection	is	incremented	when	a	login	action	is	detected	in	a	connection.	It	is	not	clear	how	this	feature	contributed	to	services	such	as	finger,	echo,	etc.	that	requires	no	login	activity.	 A	more	recent	network	traffic	dataset,	such	as	the	UNB	ISCX	Intrusion	Detection	Evaluation	DataSet	2012	[1]	should	be	transformed	into	a	suitable	form	for	ML	and	knowl-	edge	discovery	applications.	This	leads	us	to	suggest	a	collaboration	project	between	leading	research	institutes	and	research	communities	to	generate	and	share	similar	datasets.	A	new	project	could	release	the	latest	versions	of	datasets	at	time	intervals	to	address	changes	in	network	behaviour	and	take	into	account	changes	in	attack	strategies	or	types	of	malware.	Having	a	transparently	created	and	updateable	dataset	for	use	by	researchers	is	a	core	requirement	for	analysis	and	comparison.	Finally,	this	paper	urges	that	DARPA	and	KDD	should	no	longer	be	used	as	a	testbed	for	IDS	training	and	evaluation.	 	Acknowledgments	 We	thank	the	editor	and	the	anonymous	reviewers	for	their	constructive	comments	and	suggestions,	which	provided	a	great	help	in	improving	this	paper.	 Availability	of	source	codes	 All	source	codes	used	in	the	analysis	during	this	study	are	available	from	the	corresponding	author	on	request.	After	tidying	the	code,	it	might	be	placed	in	a	public	repository	to	be	accessible	for	researchers.	 
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Appendix	A.	Some	DARPA	to	KDD	Telnet	attack	connections		
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Appendix	B.	Connection	No.	1,446,934	 The	following	is	the	KDD	values	of	connection	number	‘1,446,934’	and	Telnet	session	content.	 
 
 
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and unshaded ones are the 
responses from server to client)  
 
Appendix B. Connection No. 1,446,934
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘1,446,934’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 1446934
DARPA Week4   Friday   (192.168.1.10:23070   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
alie
login: alie
ali7
Password:
Last login: Fri Jun 26 07:49:08 from listserv.com
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized. Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
which gcc
pascal>
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX898872970XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX898872970XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX898872970XX\`
? XX898872970XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/224332 /tmp/22433.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/224332 /tmp/22433.c
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX898872979XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX898872979XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX898872979XX\`
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Appendix B. Connection No. 1,446,934
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘1,446,934’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 1446934
DARPA Week4   Friday   (192.168.1.10:23070   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
alie
login: ali
ali7
Password:
Last login: Fri Jun 26 07:49:08 from listserv.com
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized. Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
which gcc
pascal>
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX898872970XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX898872970XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX898872970XX\`
? XX898872970XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/224332 /tmp/22433.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/224332 /tmp/22433.c
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX898872979XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX898872979XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX898872979XX\`
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? XX898872979XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/224333 /tmp/22433.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/224333 /tmp/22433.c
/tmp/224332
pascal> /tmp/224332
Jumping to address 0xeffff6b8 B[364] E[400] SO[704]
/tmp/224333
#
/tmp/224333
# # # #
# ^D..exit
.
#
^D..#
.
pascal>
pascal> ^D..logout
.
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Appendix	C.	Connection	No.	3,429,269	 The	following	is	the	KDD	values	of	connection	number	‘3,429,269’	and	Telnet	session	content.		
 
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and unshaded ones are the 
responses from server to client)  
 
Appendix C. Connection No. 3,429,269
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘3,429,269’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 3429269
DARPA Week5   Wednesday   (197.182.91.233:15374   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
u shaded ones are the responses from erver to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
alie
login: alie
ali7
Password:
Last login: Wed Jul  1 16:12:34 from 194.27.251.21
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized.  Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
June 25'th 1998:
Due to severe thunderstorms over Eyrie AFB, many of the systems on the EAFB network were knocked out, and network 
traffic to the rest of the internet was disrupted.  Most systems are now back on line, and we expect all remaining 
services to be restored shortly.
which gcc
pascal>
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX899347368XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX899347368XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX899347368XX\`
? XX899347368XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/178572 /tmp/17857.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/178572 /tmp/17857.c
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX899347375XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX899347375XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
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The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘3,429,2 9’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 3429269
DARPA Week5   Wednesday   (197.182.91.233:15374   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet cont nt as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
alie
login: alie
ali7
Password:
Last login: Wed Jul  1 16:12:34 from 194.27.251.21
Sun Micro ystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic Novemb r 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized.  Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
June 25'th 1998:
Due to severe thunderstorms over Eyrie AFB, many of the systems on the EAFB network were knocked out, and network 
traffic to the rest of the internet was disrupted.  Most systems are now back on line, and we expect all remaining 
services to be restored shortly.
which gcc
pascal>
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX899347368XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX899347368XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
end
? end
XX899347368XX\`
? XX899347368XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/178572 /tmp/17857.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/178572 /tmp/17857.c
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
uudecode<<XX899347375XX\`
pascal> uudecode<<XX899347375XX\`
⁞
... TRUNCATED ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
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end
? end
XX899347375XX\`
? XX899347375XX\`
/bin/gcc -o /tmp/178573 /tmp/17857.c
pascal> /bin/gcc -o /tmp/178573 /tmp/17857.c
/tmp/178572
pascal> /tmp/178572
Jumping to address 0xeffff7e0
Jumping to address 0xeffff7e0 B[364] E[400] SO[400]
/tmp/178573
#
/tmp/178573
# # #
^D..#
# exit
.
#
^D..#
.
pascal>
pascal> ^D..logout
.
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Appendix	D.	Connection	No.	7449	 The	following	is	the	KDD	values	of	connection	number	‘7449’	and	Telnet	session	content.		
 
 		 	
Appendix D. Connection No. 7449
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘7449’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 7449
DARPA Week1   Monday   (135.8.60.182:1941   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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57 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 …
Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
tristank
login: tristank
AqEwoPJN
Password:
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized.  Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
tcsh: using dumb terminal settings.
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
cat > ffbexploit.c
pascal> cat > ffbexploit.c
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
./bin/gcc -o ffbexploit ffbexploit.c
^D..pascal> /bin/gcc -o ffbexploit ffbexploit.c
./ffbexploit
pascal> ./ffbexploit
ffbconfig: ............................................................-......n/......h................;...#...#..
.#.... ;.. ....... ... ....`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`..
.`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`
...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`: No such file or directory
#
^D..#
.
pascal>
pascal> ^D..logout
.
34 A. M. AL TOBI AND I. DUNCAN
Appendix D. Connection No. 7449
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘7449’ and Telnet session content.
K D Connection No. 7449
DARPA Week1   Monday   (135.8.60.182:1941   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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57 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 …
Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
tristank
login: t i tank
AqEwoPJN
Password:
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5       Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized.  Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
tcsh: using dumb terminal settings.
which gcc
pascal> which gcc
/bin/gcc
cat > ffbexploit.c
pascal> cat > ffbexploit.c
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
./bin/gcc -o ffbexploit ffbexploit.c
^D..pascal> /bin/gcc -o ffbexploit ffbexploit.c
./ffbexploit
pascal> ./ffbexploit
ffbconfig: ............................................................-......n/......h................;...#...#..
.#.... ;.. ....... ... ....`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`..
.`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`
...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`...`: No such file or directory
#
^D..#
.
pascal>
pascal> ^D..logout
.
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Appendix	E.	Connection	No.	3,927,225	 The	following	is	the	KDD	values	of	connection	number	‘3,927,225’	and	Telnet	session	content.	 
 	 	
Appendix E. Connection No. 3,927,225
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘3,927,225 ’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 3927225
DARPA Week5   Friday   (197.218.177.69:20504   172.16.113.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …
Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
SunOS UNIX (zeno)
wardc
login: wardc
nqXiqjyA
Password:
SunOS Release 4.1.4 (LUGH) #1: Tue Oct 10 12:12:31 EDT 1995
which loadmodule
zeno> which loadmodule
loadmodule: Command not found.
whereis loadmodule
zeno> whereis loadmodule
loadmodule:
pushd /usr/openwin/bin
zeno> pushd /usr/openwin/bin
/usr/openwin/bin ~
ls -F loadmodule
zeno> ls -F loadmodule
loadmodule*
popd
zeno> popd
~
cat > bin
zeno> cat > bin
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
.chmod 755 bin
^D..zeno> chmod 755 bin
sh -c "IFS=/ /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule a b"
zeno> sh -c "IFS=/ /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule a b"
/usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule: /usr/sys/sun4/OBJ/a file does not exist.
Check your OpenWindows installation.
rm bin
zeno> rm bin
./sh
zeno> ./sh
#
.
^D..# zeno>
zeno> ^D..logout
.
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Appendix	F.	Connection	No.	406,471	 The	following	is	the	KDD	values	of	connection	number	‘406,471’	and	Telnet	session	content.	 
 
Appendix F. Connection No. 406,471
The following is the KDD values of connection number ‘406,471’ and Telnet session content.
KDD Connection No. 406471
DARPA Week3   Monday   (202.247.224.89:25134   172.16.112.50:23)
KDD Features [1 … 21]:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 21 …
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07 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 …
Basic Features
(Total: 9)
Content Features
(Total: 13) …
Telnet content as present in DARPA: (Shaded lines are the requests from client to server and 
unshaded ones are the responses from server to client)
UNIX(r) System V Release 4.0 (pascal)
clintonl
login: clintonl
clinton7
Password: 
Last login: Mon Jun 15 11:26:30 from 194.27.251.21
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.5 Generic November 1995
Official U.S. government system for authorized use only. Do not discuss, enter, transfer, process or transmit 
classified/sensitive national security information of greater sensitivity than that for which this system is 
authorized.  Use of the system constitutes consent to security testing and monitoring.  Unauthorized use could 
result in criminal prosecution. Unauthorized use and misuse of government equipment includes, but is not limited 
to, playing computer games (hack,doom), sending chain letters, gambling (sporting pools), personal business, 
pornography, or anything that can offend or be construed as sexual harassment.
who
pascal> who
bramy      console      Jun 15 07:50
williamf   pts/0        Jun 15 08:18    (alpha.apple.edu)
clintonl   pts/1        Jun 15 11:32    (202.247.224.89)
janes      pts/2        Jun 15 08:20    (alpha.apple.edu)
georgeb    pts/3        Jun 15 09:07    (alpha.apple.edu)
donaldh    pts/5        Jun 15 08:39    (alpha.apple.edu)
fredd  pts/6        Jun 15 08:54    (alpha.apple.edu)
ls
pascal> ls
src
cat > ffb.c << EOF
pascal> cat > ffb.c << EOF
⁞
... TRUNCATED  ...  Loading file content  ...
⁞
gcc -o ffb ffb.c
pascal> gcc -o ffb ffb.c
./ffb
pascal> ./ffb
Jumping to address 0xeffffa68 B[128] E[256] SO[128]
ffbconfig: ............................................................-......n/......h................;...#...#..
.#.... ;.. ....... ... ....h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h..
.h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h
...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h...h: No such file or directory
id
# id
uid=2050(clintonl) gid=100(users) euid=0(root)
ls /home
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# ls /home
TT_DB       desmonds    gwendolv    lanaa       orionc      triav
abramh      doireano    haraldl     lavernel    parkerm     tristank
adrieni     donaldh     henningm    leandere    quintond    ulandusm
alie        elmoc henriker    liliana     rachaelc    valeskad
ansgarz     emonc       huws        lost+found  raeburnt    victors
avrap       erink       hyacintl    lucyj       randip      violetp
bedeliaa    felinai     inghami     lupitam     rexn        virginil
bellej      finnm       ingolfk     margarej    reynaldv    wardc
bramy       franko      jackj       mariaht     roderica    williamf
camronw     fredd       janes       mariel      romeob      wojciecd
cartert     ftp         janinee     marilenc    selmam      yannisb
charlab     galeo       jaroslan    marlenag    soniac      yuvalt
charlotk    geoffp      jennifed    marlync     sumikop     yvonnea
christim    georgeb     joelo       marlyy      suser       yvonnej
cliffu      georgind    jouniw      mistyd      suzannac    zephyro
clintonl    giovanng    katinas     operator    suzannas
darleent    grzegors    kiaraa      orindag     tonyae
cd /var
# cd /var
cd log
# cd log
ls
# ls
authlog          dead.letter      sysidconfig.log  syslog
tail syslog
# tail syslog
Jun 15 11:30:21 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: 
to=wardc@pascal.eyrie.af.mil,emonc@pascal.eyrie.af.mil,geoffp@pascal.eyrie.af.mil,janinee@pascal.eyrie.af.mil, 
ctladdr=geoffp (2065/100), delay=00:00:01, mailer=local, stat=Sent
Jun 15 11:31:12 pascal sendmail[3156]: LAA03156: from=<denises@epsilon.pear.com>, size=2384, class=0, pri=32384, 
nrcpts=1, msgid=<19980615113112.CAA989>, proto=ESMTP, relay=epsilon.pear.com [195.115.218.108]
Jun 15 11:31:13 pascal sendmail[3157]: LAA03156: to=<geoffp@pascal.eyrie.af.mil>, delay=00:00:01, mailer=local, 
stat=Sent
Jun 15 11:32:16 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: to=lolaa@delta.peach.mil, ctladdr=geoffp (2065/100), 
delay=00:01:56, mailer=ether, relay=delta.peach.mil [194.7.248.153], stat=Sent (Mail accepted)
Jun 15 11:32:17 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: to=joyh@gamma.grape.mil,georginl@gamma.grape.mil, ctladdr=geoffp 
(2065/100), delay=00:01:57, mailer=ether, relay=gamma.grape.mil [194.27.251.21], stat=Sent (Mail accepted)
Jun 15 11:32:17 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: to=wilburs@finch.eyrie.af.mil, ctladdr=geoffp (2065/100), 
delay=00:01:57, mailer=ether, relay=finch.eyrie.af.mil. [172.16.114.168], stat=Sent (Mail accepted)
Jun 15 11:32:18 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: to=shirralm@saturn.kiwi.org, ctladdr=geoffp (2065/100), 
delay=00:01:58, mailer=ether, relay=saturn.kiwi.org [196.227.33.189], stat=Sent (Mail accepted)
Jun 15 11:32:19 pascal sendmail[3149]: LAA03148: to=denises@epsilon.pear.com, ctladdr=geoffp (2065/100), 
delay=00:01:59, mailer=ether, relay=epsilon.pear.com [195.115.218.108], stat=Sent (Mail accepted)
Jun 15 11:33:09 pascal sendmail[3178]: LAA03178: from=fredd, size=53, class=0, pri=30053, nrcpts=1, 
msgid=<199806151533.LAA03178@pascal.>, relay=fredd@localhost
Jun 15 11:33:09 pascal sendmail[3179]: LAA03178: to=williamf@pascal.eyrie.af.mil, ctladdr=fredd (2139/100), 
delay=00:00:00, mailer=local, stat=Sent
exit
# exit
logout
pascal> logout
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